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This thesis suggests a reassessment of United States and
Southeast Asian policy towards Vietnam and the other
Indochinese states. The hypothesis behind this suggestion
is simply that the current policies of isolation imposed
on Indochina do little to promote stability in the region;
drive Indochina further into the Soviet sphere: and do not
serve the long range interests of the United States and
other nations of the region. It explores the possibility of
ASEAN— Indochinese rapprochement, based on encouraging proper
interactive behavior by Indochina through linking such
behavior to economic incentives. It is postulated that
such actions can lead to regional interdependency and long
term political stability.
To this end, comparative national interests/policies are
examined within the context of military, political, , and
economic interaction in Southeast Asia. Weaknesses and
strengths are highlighted and areas for mutual cooperation
explored. Options for the future arB discussed and an
emphasis on internal economic growth is suggested as the
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent vears, the regional balance of cower in
Southeast Asia has shown increasing oclaritv and
instability. The polar actors represent two aligned camps;
the non-communist countries of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN): and the communist countries o-f the
Indochina Bloc.
While this increasing polaritv is due in large part to
ideological differences, there ars other egually significant
causal factors. Though polarity in Southeast Asia is often
viewed as a simple extension of the superpowers global
conflict, it is also a manifestation of traditional regional
hostilities. These hostilities stem from philosophical
differences and imbalances in local national assets, as well
as from the competing interests of regional and extra-
regional powers. The resultant regional balance of power
is precarious, unstable, and ever threatens to deteriorate
into armed conflict.
The unequal distribution of available resources between
polar actors is prevalent in each of the military,
political, and economic arenas of interactive national
interests/policy. Vietnam, leader of the Indcchinese Bloc,
is strong in the military arena but weak in political and
economic interaction. To compensate for their weaknesses,
the Vietnamese ars prone to deal with the ASEAN states bv
10

brandishing the sword and threatening militarv -force.
Understandably, this is unacceptable to the ASEAN countries.
Conversely, ASEAN is strongest in the economic arena of
interaction. Since its -founding in 1967, ASEAN has become
an economic powerhouse and as a unified entity it exerts
considerable influence politically. This has been
accomplished while avoiding formal military agreements.
Unfortunately, the lack of a formal military arrangement has
often emphasised the individual weaknesses of its members,
especially true in the face of the rising threat posed bv a
militarily united Indochinese bloc. Cften fearful of
Vietnam's military caoabilities and intentions. the ASEAN
countries attemoted to use political and economic means to
isolate and neutralize Indochina. Such a containment
strategy, however, has onlv limited utilitv as the West
has come to realize in their own dealings with totalitarian
powers. For Vietnam and an Indochina that hungers for
economic develooment, these circumstances are becoming
unacceptable as well.
The interests and policies of external powers has also
added to the instability of the region over the vears.
Perceived weaknesses in both the ASEAN and Indochina camos
have often been exploited bv external actors to serve their
goals. China, the Soviet Union, and the United States
have all contributed to this instability and have often
actively encouraged polarity amongst regional actors.
11

Bearing in mind the importance of external interests, such
interests and policies will be examined onlv as thev
directly at-fect speci-fic regional issues.
Among the major concerns o-f ASEAN and the West 5.re
uncertainties and apprehensions over Vietnamese and Soviet
regional ambitions. Normalisation of relations between
ASEAN and Indochina has suffered accordingly. While these
concerns have been voiced primarily by Thailand (ASEAN 's
"-Front line" state), all the ASEAN countries have interests
that would be damaged by continued communist expansionism.
Thus, since the 1979 Vietnamese invasion and occuoation of
Kampuchea. Thailand and Singapore have been adamant
opponents o-f any suggestion of normalization with Vietnam
and the Indochinese states.
Beyond the modern factors of the polar situation in
Southeast Asia, traditional enmity and susoicion between
Thailand and Vietnam plays a significant role in current
regional tensions. Thai -Viet hatreds have a long history
of development through mutual struggles for security,
usually pursued at the expense of one another's resources.
Therefore, a scrutiny of Thai—Vietnamese relationships is
essential to understanding the true nature of the regional
conf rontati on.
Gi /en the historical complexities of the area. the
present confrontation is not simclv an extension of the
1 c

superpower ccn-flict, nor can it be dismissed in simplistic
terms as just another local contest between Communism and
Democracy. Stripped o-f external overtones and viewed in
historical perspective, the situation in Southeast Asia
derives primarily -from long standing disputes between
competing regional cultures and national interests. This
paoer will examine the current problems o-f the area in that
context
.
This thesis presents a case -for the reassessment o-f
United States and Southeast Asian oolicv towards Vietnam and
the other Indochinese states. The basic hypothesis
underlying this it that the current policies o-f isolation do
little to promote stability in the region; serve to drive
Indochina -further into the Soviet Sphere; and generally do
not serve the long range interests o-f the United States and
the other nations o-f the region, including Vietnam. This
thesis explores the possibility of an ASEAN-Indochinese
rapprochement based on encouraging proper interactive
behavior by Indochina, and linking such behavior to
incentives o-f economic prosperity. It postulates that such
interaction will lead to healthy interdependencv and long
term regional stability. Local national interests/policies
are examined in the context o-f military, political, and
economic interaction. Weaknesses and strengths ^rs




Chapter I of this paper is a brief discussion of
format and procedure, the political climate of the region.
and the background of the two groups involved. To
accurately assess regional prospects for integration and
cooperation, Chapters II, III, and IV compare the national
interests and policies within interactive military,
political, and economic arenas of the pertinent states.
Individual and group goals, methods and achievements are
discussed within the fabric of the these arenas. These
factors are then examined for their impact on the foreign
policy positions of the two aligned factions.
Chapter V summarizes some of the more important foreign
policy problems of the region, particularly hose that
sustain the current atmosphere of hostility and hinder
efforts towards normalization. Divisions of opinion over
security concerns and specific foreign policy issues within
the two groups are examined. These positions are
subsequently arrayed against the various options for problem
resolution. Strategy options are explored at this point for
a reduction of local tensions, and for long term regional
stability. This is followed by concluding remarks
addressing the prospects for peace in the future of
Southeast Asia and what this may mean for American interests




1- ASEAN' s Development .
The Association o-F Southeast Asian Nations. or
ASEAN, was -formed in August 1967. This organization was
created at a time o-f political uncertainty over continued
American presence in the region and when Vietnam was
beginning to show signs o-f militarily expanding the war in
Indochina. In this atmosphere o-f political instability,
the -five nations of Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore.
Malaysia. and the Philippines united to promote internal
security and to strengthen their political and economic
hands. The recently independent nation o-f Brunei became
ASEAN 's sixth member in January 1984. The primary interests
o-f ASEAN have been to increase the regional political
strength and the social and economic development' of the
membership. The general objectives o-f the organization ars
spelled out more completely in the extracts of the Bangkok
Declaration of 1967, a copy of which has been included at
Appendix A.
The structural organization of ASEAN is verv loosely
defined. A central Secretariat, located in Jakarta,
monitors various ad hoc and permanent committees that
conduct the business of the association. There are nine
permanent committees including:
"Trade and Tourism: Industry, Minerals and Energy;
Food. Agriculture and Forestry; Transportation and

Communications: Finance and banking; Science and
Technology; Social Development; Culture and
Information; and Budget ." CEurooa, 1983:121:
These committees are ultimately responsible for direction
to the annual Ministerial Conference. held in a different
member country each year. Each committee is headquartered
in one or another of the member nation's capitals. These
headquarters are rotated through the various capital cities
every two to three years. Additional organisations such as
working groups and temporary sub—committees are responsible
for servicing the permanent committees.
Findings and recommendations of the permanent
committees are forwarded to the General Secretariat located
in Jakarta. This centrally located bodv is technically
responsible for administrative direction of the separate
National Secretariats. Recommendations and directives
decided on by the General Secretariat are passed to the
Standing Committee and final lv to the Foreign Ministers for
final approval.
In conjunction with socioeconomic development. ASEAN
conducts collective diplomatic actions on certain regional
security issues, such as problems with Indochina. This
collective action falls short of unified military actions,
(other than selective bilaterally conducted exercises) as
ASEAN has never been and is not planning to become a































SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, 1983. "ASEAN/* background
notes, Washi ngton: U. S. Government Printing Office. (November)
Figure 1-1 ASEAN Organizational Chart - 1983
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Note that the preceeding diagram reflects the
organization of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
as it was in 1983. Since then, Brunei has been added to the
National Secretariats.
Not surprisingly, it is ASEAN's diDlomatic activitv
that has gained much of the notoriety it enjoys in the
international community. While working to reduce regional
tensions and promote stability, ASEAN has promulgated some
rather controversial policies. The first of these was the
Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971 which declared Southeast
Asia to be a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality." In
soecific terms this meant, "regional freedom and neutrality,
free from any form or manner of interference bv outside
powers. " CWi 1 son , 1975: 28-323 Subsequent interpretations of
this pronouncement varied not only in the viewpoints of
outsiders but also in these of individual members of ASEAN.
Needless to sav , the practical enforcement of this
declaration is infeasible, nor is it expected to change in
the near future.
Two more ASEAN declarations were forthcoming hard on
the heels of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. In 1976 at
the first summit meeting of ASEAN heads of state, the






. . principles o-f mutual respect -for the
independence and sovereignty o-f all nations:
noninterference in the internal affairs of one
another; settlement of disputes bv peaceful means;
and effective co-operation among the five
countries. " CEuropa, 19S3: 121
]
The other document signed at this meeting was the
Declaration of Concord. This paper provided guidelines -For:
"...action in economic, social and cultural
relations. This includes cooperation in the pursuit
of political stability in the region; the members
would give priority to the supply of one another's
needs for commodities, particularly food and energy,
in any emergency; and the provision for forming
industrial projects in common. " E ibid. ,: 1223
Additional agreement was reached on the need for a long term
preferential trade arrangement among member states. It was
also recognised that the first priority for ASEAN in 1976
was to develop joint action for trading in the international
market.
These events mark the advent of serious economic co-
operation and diplomatic interaction on the part of the
ASEAN nations. A survey of the organization's operations
since 1967 (See Appendix B) shows 1975-76 as the real take-
off point in ASEAN activities.
2. Indochina's Evolution .
Any discussion of the Indochina subregicn consisting
of Vietnam. Kampuchea ior Cambodia) and Laos must address
the clear domination of this bloc bv Vietnam, both
militarily and politically. Secondly, there is amole
19

historical precedence for Indochina's
differentiation and for its domination by Vietnamese Hanoi.
Hanoi 's domination was established as earlv as the
mid-lSOOs bv the French. French colonial administration of
the Indochinese Federation was based on centralized control,
with the seat of that government located at Hanoi in the
-former Viet province of Tongking. Furthermore, the superior
industry and adaptability o-f the Tongking Vietnamese led the
French to use them at various levels of the colonial
administration throughout Indochina, which included many low
level government posi tions. CCady , 1964:431-5561 This
situation continued basically unchanged through the Japanese
occupation of World War II, and ended only recently with the
eviction of the French and the Geneva Agreement of 1954.
The Union of Indochina existed, therefore, as a distinct
political and economic entity under essentially French-
Vietnamese domination for approximately 100 years.
Considering that the current period of Vietnamese
"protectionism" was formalized in 1973-79, Vietnamese
control of Indochina has only been lacking 25 years of the
last century and a half.
The ideol ogi cal /legal basis of the current alignment
of Indochina goes back to 1930 with the founding of the
Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) under the direction of
Nguven Ai-Quoc, better known as Ho Chi Minh. This
20

organization was the -first formalized political movement
created -for the express purpose o-f liberating the whole o-f
colonial French Indochina. Indochinese Communist Party
operations covered Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam,
though its membership was composed almost entirely of
Vietnamese. Ostensibly the ICP was dissolved in 1945,
breaking into separate parties for each of the three
countries of Indochina. The leadership of all three
parties, however, remained in the hands of the
Vietnamese. Evan der Kroef , 1980:40-473 Current evidence
suggests that tight Vietnamese control of the Communist
Parties of Cambodia and Laos has been maintained over the
vears. The annual summit meetings of the Indochina Foreign
Ministers ars used as a forum to reinforce the unitv of
Indochina in terms of Vietnamese dominance, the ICP, and Ho
Chi Minh's legacy of a "special solidarity among three
peoples. "CJPRS, (5 January) 1983:49-58]
From this basis alone, it is clear that Vietnamese
perceptions of their role in Indochinese affairs a.rs
influenced by historical considerations, as well as by
ideological and national security interests. Legalization
of these interests between the three governments takes the
form of special agreements and Treaties of Friendship and Co-
operation based on the Soviet example.
Appendix B is a chronological summarv of major
developments in Vietnam. Laos and Kampuchea covering their
21

trans-formation into the present unified Indochina. While
this -federation actually dates from about 1973. the
Indochina chronology begins in 1967 to correspond with the
period o-f ASEAN 's development.
C. THE THREE ARENAS.
To appreciate the present confrontation in Southeast
Asia, an in-depth comparison and assessment of the three
arenas o-f national interests/policies of interaction
between the two camps is critical. Military, political and
economic interaction are therefore the subjects of the
following chapters, and individual country positions on
particular issues are discussed onlv as they differ from the
group consensus. While not all the issues presented are
delineated along strictly bipolar lines (notably the lack of
a formal military alliance among the ASEAN membership) the
potential for unified action within each arena of interests
is great enough to warrant comparison. Comparisons of
national interests will be made frcm a bipolar. ASEAN-
Indochina orientation.

II. THE MILITARY ARENA
The lack of balance in the military arena of interactive
national interests is probably the largest contributing
•factor to the present climate of instability in Southeast
Asia. Backed by the Soviet Union, Vietnam has conducted an
unprecedented arms build-up in recent years that has reached
alarming proportions. The size o-f this growing -force when
combined with the communist philosophy o-f its owners poses
a potential military threat to all of the other countries in
the ar&ai. This chapter examines the comparative imbalance
of military relations in the region between the communist
and non-communist nations, Hanoi's military intentions and
capabilities, and the ASEAN country's strategy for dealing
with the Vietnamese threat.
A. THE REGIONAL MILITARY IMBALANCE.
Vietnam's quest for independence and security ower the
last three hundred years has characteristically been a
struggle against more powerful and aggressive external
forces. China, Japan. France, and America have all
attempted to canauer and occupy Vietnamese territory at some
point in the modern era. To combat these periodic external
threats, Vietnam has endeavored to build an armed force that
is capable of large scale defense. Ironically, while
ostensibly defensively motivated, these efforts have
resulted in a war machine that rivals those of the

superpowers. With close to a million and a half men under
arms, the People's Army o-f Vietnam (PAVN) is the third
largest military
-Force in the warl d. CPi ke, (4-6 August)
1982: ID Un-Fortunately
-for the rest of Southeast Asia,
Vietnam's purported defensive intentions have often been
exhibited in the form of offensive actions. The occupation
of Laos by 1973, and the invasion and occupation of
Kampuchea in 1979 are two of the more visible examples of
Vietnamese ambitions. It is these circumstances, and the
threat of even more ambitious operations to come that has
resulted in the atmosphere of tense uncertainty in Southeast
Asia today.
In contrast to Vietnamese motivations for their force
structure, the other states of the region have mostly been
concerned with internal security problems during the years
since World War II. They have therefore planned and
constructed their armed forces accordingly. Most of the
ASEAN country's military establishments ar& founded on
paramilitary lines. They ars often poorly organized,
lightly armed, and only marginally trained for conventional
war tasks, Vietnam, on the other hand, is rapidlv
perfecting its military structure and is advancing far
beyond the ASEAN countries on almost every level of
organization, equipment, and training. Vietnam has evolved
through conventional combat with the South, the invasion of
24

Kampuchea, and the war with China past the guerrilla war-fare
level. Soviet arms transfers and the massive input of
captured South Vietnamese weapons has made Vietnam a heavily
armored, highly mobile, conventional military force.
Additionally, the ASEAN countries have been prone to
focus their attention less on military matters and more on
the day-to-day affairs of the political and economic world.
ASEAN armed forces have traditionally been run by men who
Are politicians first and military officers second. While
this may be changing due to the increasing threat of
external militarv pressures, it will be a slow process and
one which the current leadership of the ASEAN forces mav be
unwilling to undergo. Time, events and perhaps a new
generation of leadership may be the only way for these
governments to change.
A critical element of comparative capabilities is
command and control. Analyzing the two camps, it is
clear that Hanoi commands all the forces of Indochina
through centralized channels. ASEAN, an the other hand,
is not a military organization and has no mechanisms for
exercising centralized control of its diverse national
services. Even in the event of regional security
emergencies it is doubtful that the ASEAN countries could
create an effective body for unified command and control.
Illustrating the vast military divergence between
Vietnam/Indochina and the ASEAN camps. Table 1 1 — I is a

summary of the military forces of the region. Figures shown
Are current to June 1984, and reflect the most accurate






Army* Air horce* Navv*
Men Tanks Men Planes Men Ships
INDOCHINA
Vietnam 1,220,500 1,200,000 2,500 15,000 671 8,000 192
Laos 53 , 000 50 , 000
Kampuchea 25,000**
ASEAN




Philippinell2, 800 70 , 000
Brunei 3,650 3,650
2 , 000 1 00 1 , 000
361 43,100 218 32,200
161 11,000 42 8,700




533 29,000 94 42.000 107
162 16,800 164 28,000 147
2 9
SOURCES: The Military Balance 1983-1984 , 1983. London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies: 91-102: Far
Eastern Economic Review 1933 Yearbook
,
1983. Hongkong: Far
Eastern Economic Review: 22-33.
* Equipment figures do not necessarily reflect operational
readiness.





Armed forces totals shown -for Kampuchea are only those
of the Vietnamese backed, Heng Samrin regime. A -further
breakdown of these forces is unavailable. While not
included in Table 1 1 — I , Kampuchean exile forces probably
account for an additional 40-60,000 men under arms in and on
the borders of Kampuchea and Thailand.
Figure 1 1 — 1 graphically illustrates the disproportionate
size of Vietnam's armed forces in terms of manpower alone
compared to those of its neighbors. Again, Kampuchean exile
forces are not included in the totals shown.
MILITARY MfihPOWER STRENGTHS 1983-1984
tttttm bbl —l!Ml I .'iIH_
Vietnam Laos £flaxnea mallard Malaria Singapore mxresia Pnilippire enrei
Country
Figure I I— 1 Manpower, Regional Armed Force*
27

While a total inventory o-f ASEAN-Indochina arsenals is
listed in Appendix C, a comparison o-f the major weapon
systems o-f the region is presented here.
Beginning with tanks as the most significant ground
combat system, Table II-II shows the types, country o-f
origin, and performance statistics o-f all regional tanks.
TABLE II-II
TANKS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
Country In Max. Max. Main
o-f Service Speed Range Armament Year
Model Oriain With (km/hr) (km) (mm) Produced
Main Battle Tanks
T-62 UR VN 50 650 115 1961
T-54/55 UR VN 50 600 100 1947
T-34/B5 UR VN 55 300 35 1943
Type 59 CH VN 50 600 100 1947
M-60A1 US TH/SG/VN 48 500 105 1959
M-43A2 US TH/VN 43 258 90 1951
M-48A5 US TH 43 499 105 1975
M-47 US TH/VN 53 130 90 1953
Light Tanks
PT-76 UR VN/ID 44 260 76 195:










M-41 100 76 1949
M-24 281 75 1944
Note: UR=Soviet Union: CH=China; US=United States;
FR=France; TH=Thailand; ID=Indonesi a: SG=Singapore;
PI=Phi 1 iopi nes; VN=Vietnam.
SOURCES: Jane's Armour and Artillery 1983-84 , 1983. London:
Jane's Publishing Company Ltd.; Tom Gervasi , Arsenal o-f
Democracy 1 1
,
1931. New York: Grove press.
!3

Entries under "In Service With"— indicate the one-time
availability o-f a particular weapon, not necessarily the
present operational status o-f the equipment.
A quick comparison of tank holdings and diversity ot"
types shows that Vietnam holds a significant advantage in
both -firepower and mobility. What is not reflected in
Tables II-I and II-II, is that U.S. M-60 and M-48 series
tanks ar<B Qualitatively better systems for modern armored
warfare. While the Soviet made tanks have consistently
better mobility over longer traveling ranges, the main
weapon on U.S. built tanks is more accurate and more
effective at longer gun ranges. In prepared defensive
positions, the M-60 and M-48 tanks can achieve impressive
first-round kills at a range of over 2,000 meters. CUSACGSC,
1980:5-14 j Nevertheless, ASEAN 's qualitative gun advantage
in combat would most probably be overcame by the sheer
quantity of Indochina's stocks. With the current ratio of
armored forces along the Thai-Kampuchean border, defending
Thai forces could expect an attacking tank ratio of at least
ten to one against them. Reinforcements from other ASEAN
states, should they be available, would not change this
ratio significantly.
A graphic representation of Vietnamese tank holdings in
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Figure II-2 Battle Tanks
Turning to the sea based weapon systems o-f the region,
significant naval craft of both these camps are illustrated
in Tables II-III and II-IV. While these tables do not
include all the different ship types of the region, they do
show the major lot. The largest combat vessel of the
nations of Southeast Asia is the Frigate, and/or Corvette
Class. Although new ships are entering the inventories of
many of the countries, none appear to be advancing beyond
the Frigate Class platform. This circumstance can be
expected to remain the regional standard for the rest of
this century. TABLE II-III shows the nomenclature, country
30

ot origin/service, and pertinent performance statistics o-
many o-f these kev naval weapon systems.
TABLE II-III
FRIGATES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
Country In Max. Max.
Ship o-f Service Ton- Speed Range Main













VN 950 "T'y 4,370/10 4x3in 76mm
TH/MY 1 , 290 26 6,000/16 2x4. Sin Mk 3
2x40mm Bofor
MY 2 , 300 24 4,300/15 1 x 1 00mm
4x 30mm
2x 40mm
TH 864 20 2,400/12 2x3in 76mm
2x 40mm
TH/PI 1 , 240 19 9,000/12 2x3in 76iTim
6x 40mm
TH 1 , 430 IS 7,200/12 3x3in 76mm
4x40mm
PI/VN 1,766 13 9,000/12 lx5in 127mm
PI/VN 1 ,590 19 9,000/12 2x3 in 76mm
2x 30mm
ID 1 , 450 7,000/12 lx3in 76mm
2x 37mm
ID 1,160 30 4,250/16 lx 120mm
1 x 40mm
4xEX0CET SSM
ID 950 JLJm 2,400/13 2x3in 85mm
4x25mm
MY 1 , 500 11 5,000/13 lxl 00mm
Note: UR=Soviet Union; UK=United Kingdom; US=United States;
NE=Nether lands; IT=Italy; GE=Germany; VN=Vietnam:
TH=Thailand; MY=Malaysia; PI=Phi 1 ippines; ID=Indonesi a.
SOURCES: Jane's Fighting Ships 1983-84 , 1983. London: Jane's
Publishing Co. Ltd.: Jean Labayle Couhat , ed., Combat Fleets
o-F the World 1932/33 , 1982. Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press.

As can be readily seen under—the "Country of Origin"
column, Soviet supply o-f major surface vessels to the region
has been negligible. U.S. and western shipping
manufacturers clearly lead the arms trade in naval vessels
for Southeast Asia. Because of this situation, Vietnam's
naval inventory has been degraded by the limitations of its
Soviet source o-f supply. Moscow's response to Hanoi's
seagoing security needs has been poor but with access to
western eguipment both politically and economically out of
the question, Vietnam must rely on the Russians for what
little support they can get. The result is that Vietnam's
surface fleet is aging and is capable of onlv limited
offshore duties. In sharp contrast, the individual
• countries of ASEAN have growing naval arms with capabilities
verging on that of some "blue water" navies.
Tables II-III and II-IV show that ASEAN states have
i
acquired new vessels with larger deck guns. and
significantly improved anti-shipping capabilities as opposed
to the lesser capabilities of Vietnam's older ships. While
all of the navies of Southeast Asia were primarily designed
for coastal security missions in the past, the increasing
development of off-shore economic zones appears to be
changing the direction of naval requirements for the future.
Illustrative of this future trend, other significant naval
combat cra-ft of over 100 tons in the Fast Attack Class Are
shown in Table II-IV.

TABLE II-IV
FAST ATTACK NAVAL CRAFT
Country In Max. Max.
o-f Service Ton- Speed Range Main














VN 180 45 850/30 4x30mm
4-Torpedos
VN 210 36 800/30 4x30mm
4-STYX
MY 234 37 800/25 1x57mm
1 x 40mm
2xEX0CET
TH 36 2,000/15 1x76mm
1 x 40mm
4xEXGCET
MY 240 38 1 ,850/14 1x57mm
1 x 40mm
4xEX0CET
ID/PI 120 35 2,000/17 2x 30mm
2xEX0CET
SG 410 38 1 ,300/30 1 x 76mm
2x40mm
BR 150 ^2 1 ,200/14 2x 30mm
2xEXQCET
TH 224 41 2,000/12 1x57mm
1x40mm
5x GABRIEL
SG nne 33 2,000/12 1x57mm
1x40mm
5x GABRIEL
SG 100 TO 1,300/30 1 x 40mm
2x 20mm
Note: UR=Soviet Union: FR-France: IT=Italy: SW=Sweden;
SK=South Korea; SG=Singapore: VN=Vietnam; MY=Malaysia;
TH=Thailand: ID=Indonesia; PI=Phi 1 ippines; BR=Brunei
.
SOURCES: Jane's Fighting Ships 1983-84 , 1983. London: Jane's
Publishing Co. Ltd.; Jean Labayle Couhat , ed. , Combat Fleets
o-f the World 1982/33 , 1932. Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press.

Note that naval craft with EXOCET/GABRIEL weapons are
all newer vessels, many o-f which are products of "state of
the art" technology and design. These ships are vastly
superior to older vessels armed with STYX and torpedoes.
This graphic display of regional naval strengths
illustrates the closer balance of power that exists between
the two camps in naval forces. The totals indicated in
Figure I 1-3 includes all significant combat craft afloat.































vi^xnaB l»s Kd!pxn&3 Thaiijna taijy-sia sin&yjxs inxnersia pnnippire enrol
Country
Figure II-3 Regional Naval Balance
As this comparison shows, naval power is the one area in
which the combined strengths of the ASEAN states overshadows
that of Vietnam. Additionally, the general quality of ASEAN
equipment both in terms of technology and maintenance far
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outstrips what Hanoi can -float. Only a small portion o-f
Vietnam's naval -force are fit -for sea duty. This is due in
part to its lack o-f disciplined maintenance and the paucity
o-f spare parts. The Vietnamese Navy also suffers from the
lack of fuel stocks necessary for regular deep water
exercises. The combination of these factors has severelv
degraded the overall combat readiness and operational




Vietnamese deficiencies aside, the lack of military
unity among ASEAN members tends to neutralize their naval
advantage. Thus, the regional balance of power in naval
forces remains at rough parity between the two camps.
However, should the ASEAN countries decide to pool their
resources at some future date, the naval balance could swing
decisively into their court.
Combat air power in Southeast Asia is the last area
of weapon systems critical to an understanding of the
regional military imbalance.
Vietnam is clearly attempting to improve not only the
size of its air fleet but also the sophistication and
operational capability of its air force. Soviet deliveries
of sophisticated new aircraft since at least 19S0 include
MIG-23BN/FLQGGER E; MIG-21MF/FISHBED J; and SU-20/FITTER C
multipurpose fighter aircraft . C Jacobs , (September) 1982:4913

Additionally, indications that Hanoi is attempting to
develop the means to project their power over a loncsr range
include the tact that Soviet advisors may be training
Vietnamese pilots to -fly TU-16 BADGERs on reconnaissance
missions over the South China Sea.CPike, (April) 1933:33-39:
ASEAN countries are likewise attempting to upgrade their
respective air -forces. This e-f-fort has been progressing
slowly, however, due to budgetary constraints and the
sometimes reluctant participation o-f western arms suppliers.
A case in point is the recent di-f-ficulty that Thailand has
had in obtaining the U.S. -made F-16 -fighter to modernize its
air -force.
Thus, the ASEAN states Are somewhat behind Vietnam in
acquiring new air -frames and the latest air weaponrv. The
aging ASEAN air -forces and the limited numbers o-f aircraft
operationally available downgrades their situation
considerably. In an actual combat environment, Vietnam
could probablv maintain a local air superioritv ratio o-f at
least 2 to 1 over any regional opponent. As there ^rs no
signs o-f any significant change to this situation in the
near future, the present imbalance of air forces can also be
expected to continue for some time to come.
TABLE II-V shows the major high performance combat
aircraft of Southeast Asia. This table is inclusive of all




COMBAT AIRCRAFT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
Max
. Combat
Country In Level Radius Typical
Aircraft of Service Speed (Hi-Lo-Hi) Combat



















2 , 446 400-700
F-5A/3 Ftr/Bmr US TH/PI/VN 1,400 485-495
F-5E/F Ftr/Bmr US TH/PI/MY 1,640 4S0-570
ID/SG/VN
A-4S Ftr/Bmr US ID/SG 1,062 400-600








































Note: UR=Soviet Unions US=United States; VN=Vietnam;
TH=Thailand; PI=Phi 1 iooi nes; MY=Malavsia; IB=Indonesia;
SG=Si ngapor e.
SOURCES: Tom Gervasi , Arsenal o-f Democracy II , 19S1. New
York: Grove Press: Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1983-84,
1933. London: Jane's Publishing Company Ltd.
A graphic representation o-f the entire combat aircraft
holdinas o-f the countries at the region is shown in Fiaure

II-4. This includes both high performance and propeller
driven combat airplanes.
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Figure 1 1-4 Combat Aircraft
The foregoing tables and figures clearly display the
comparative strengths and weaknesses of the region's armed
farces. They also show that in the event of open conflict
between Vietnam and any ASEAN country, a military
unification of ASEAN would be almost a prereguisite to
immediate survival. Perhaps even more significantly, this
imbalance tends to indicate that none of the non-communist
nations in Southeast Asia could long sustain their
independence against a determined military assault, without
the assistance of the United States and the West.
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This then sets the stage -for an examination of how
Vietnam uses the regional imbalance of militarv power to
achieve its goals in Southeast Asia. As will be shown, the
methods of Hanoi's goal achievement are often pursued at the
expense of ASEAN 's interests.
B. THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY THREAT.
Unfortunately, the massive size of Vietnam's army has
temDted the leadership in Hanoi to embark on dangerous
courses of adventurism in the use (or misuse) of PAVN. PAVN
has been used in the recent past for several of-fensive
operations to include the invasion and occupation of three
formerly sovereign neighbors, and the 'continuing
intimidation of a fourth.
Vietnam's armed threat to Southeast Asia can be broken
down into three general catagories: Subversion, Border
War/Incursi ons , and outright Military Invasion. Vietnam is
experienced in the conduct of all three.
1 . Subversion .
From the end of World War II through the 1970 's, the
nations of Southeast Asia were primarily faced with internal
security threats of subversion. While the armed insurgent
movements of the region were originally formed as
nationalist efforts to oust western colonialism, manv groups
remained in the post-colonial sra. The majoritv of these
remnant insuraents were communist organizations dedicated
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not to nationalism but to the destruction o-f non-communist
national governments.
The communist government of Vietnam has often been
instrumental in supporting, directing, and in some cases
lending combat -forces to manv o-f the post World War
subversive organizations in the region. This activity
decreased by the end o-f the 70's due to Hanoi's split with
Peking and their subsequent pre—occupation with
conventional wars with both China and Kampuchea. For all
intents and purposes, Vietnamese suppcrt to covert
operations had come to an end by 1979.
Vietnam's move into the Soviet camp in 197S -further
added to the rapid decline o-f subversion in the ASEAN
countries. Hanoi's swing to Moscow served to exacerbate
Sino-Soviet di -f -f erences in the ranks o-f the various regional
communist parties. This, in turn, led to internal
•f racti oni zati on and, as in Thailand's case, mass de-fections
to the ASEAN authorities. CHeaton , 1982: 7S5-7S6J The decline
o-f Chinese, Soviet, and Vietnamese support to ASEAN ' s
insurgent groups has allowed the indigenous governments to
bring the problem under control. In manv cases the ASEAN
states have been able to virtually eradicate the insurgent
threat
.
Presently, continuing military pressure on the
Chinese-Vietnamese border and the problems o-f occupation in
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both Laos and Kampuchea seems to be~'-fully occupvinc Hanoi's
attentions. Should these conditions change, however, and
political motivations dictate it, Vietnam could decide to
renew subversive activities abroad at any time. As Douglas
Pike points out, Vietnam has the "...proven abilitv to -forge
and manage an organizational (insurgent) weapon and make its
will -Felt at considerable di stance. " CPi ke, (November)
1981:63 While keeping this in mind, the current Vietnamese
threat of large scale subversion directed against ASEAN
apoears to be slight.
Much of the reported subversive activitv along the
Thai -Mai aysi an border may be related to other dissident
groups. Although generally spoken o-f under the broad brush
o-f " communist activity," many opposition group attacks on
both Thai and Malavsian government positions are perpetrated
by Muslim separatists. Being Muslim, these organizations
get their sustenance -from other than communist suppliers.
No evidence as yet unearthed indicates that suppliers o-f
Muslim separatist groups have any connection with Hanoi.
The Vietnamese subversive threat should, there-fore. not be
con-fused with the Muslim movement. Other than creating a
general atmosphere o-f instability -for the legitimate
authorities, the two groups are both separate and distinct
o-f purpose.
Pockets o-f remaining communist insurgent activitv.
includina elements o-f the Communist Partv o-f Thailand (CPT) ,
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and segments o-f the Malaysian Communist Party (MCP/CPM) in
Peninsular Southeast Asia are shown in Appendix D, Map 2.
2. Border War/Incursions .
Border warfare has been an ongoing problem along the
Thai -Kampuchean border -for many hundreds o-f years. However,
Vietnamese operations along that boundary are a -fairly
recent phenomena. Since 1979, most Vietnamese military
activities have been -focused on the pursuit and destruction
c-f ousted Kampuchean -farces. These -forces have been
operating against Vietnam -from strongholds along the Thai-
Kampuchean border. Hanoi's border campaigns until mid 1980
had -followed a -fairly regular pattern o-f extensive defensive
and limited offensive operations against exile forces within
Kampuchea.
This pattern of Vietnamese border operations took on
drastic new proportions on June 23, 1980. Elements of the
Vietnamese 75th Infantry Division crossed the international
border and engaged regular Thai Army trocps in a pitched
battle lasting more than 24 hours. While the total
strength of the Vietnamese forces on the ground in Thailand
probably never exceeded more than 250 troops, two Thai
villages and two Kampuchean refugee camps were overrun.
Thailand was forced to use helicopter gunships, jet
fighters, and tanks to push the Vietnamese back. Thai
casualties included 22 killed and 28 wounded. Vietnamese
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losses were estimated at 75 killed. CNi ksch , (February)
1931:223] Appendix D, Map 3 shows the general disposition
o-f Thai and Vietnamese
-forces in the border area. The site
o-f the June 23rd incursion is indicated bv an arrow.
More recently, on the 24th of March 1984, the
Vietnamese conducted another major cross-border operation
that involved even larger -forces. This time, at least two
regiments o-f the Vietnamese 307th and 302nd Infantry
Divisions were reported to have conducted a sweep of a large
exile camp near Preah Vihear, in the Dongrek
Mountains. CMcBeth, (12 April) 1984:133 The location of the
attack was inside Thai territory, but directed against the
base camp of the Khmer Rouge 612th and 616th Divisions.
Although reports on this incident are sketchy, it appears
that the involvement of Thai forces was limited to artillerv
exchanges against a small concentration of Vietnamese
infantrv and a few tanks. Thai officials claim to have
destroyed two Viet tanks with artillery fire on Thai soil
and killed up to 50 Vietnamese soldiers. Thai sources
reported their casualties as light with onlv five killed and
possibly 30 wounded.
C
ibi d. , : 143
While in both of these cases the Vietnamese
eventually withdrew from Thai territory, the lesson their
actions demonstrated has been more than clear. Hanoi has
the military force and the resolution to engineer border
operations where and when they are deemed politically
4Z

necessary. In previous incidents o-f cross-border
operations, Hanoi clearly intended not only to destroy
bothersome Kampuchean guerrillas but also to intimidate
Thailand's anti -Vietnamese leadership. Periodic reminders
o-f Vietnamese military capabilities and their willingness to
act ar& no doubt designed to force a more accomodating
attitude from Thailand, as well as from the ASEAN states in
general. Smaller scale lessons in intimidation, such as
periodic artillery shellings of Thai villages and
Kampuchean refugee camps, continue. Border incidents and
the threat of additional incursions remain a source of
grave concern for the Thai government.
3. Invasion .
Vietnam's threat of a partial. or full scale
invasion is another threat that is confined at this time to
Thailand. This has not always been the case however.
Vietnam's current military momentum was initiated in
1975 with Hanoi 's invasion and conguest of the former
Republic of South Vietnam. The success of this effort
followed nearly 30 years of constant warfare against the
South, with a cost of millions of lives and dollars in war
associated expenditures. Estimates of the number of war
related deaths in South Vietnam alone between 1960 and 1975
ars over the two million mark. CSi vard , 1932:15]
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Destruction o-f the government of the South did not
satisfy the Hanoi leadership's thirst -for territory.
Following consolidation, the Vietnamese once again focused
attention on their immediate neighbors, Laos and KamDuchea.
Vietnamese occupation o-f Laos was -formally
acknowledged under the provisions o-f the Vietnam-Laos Treaty
o-f Friendship and Co-operation signed by the communist
governments of both countries in 1973. This document lent a
legal air to a Vietnamese presence which had been in-countrv
since at least the early 1950's. However. under the
provisions o-f the 1978 treaty, the status of Laos has been
reduced to that o-f a Vietnamese vassal state. This
relationship is further insured by the continued presence
of Vietnamese combat troops throughout the country.
The Vietnamese invasion and occupation o-f Kampuchea
in 1979 followed a more conventional pattern of modern
war-fare than tactics used in the past. Hanoi conducted a
Blitzkrieg attack which engulfed the eastern half o-f the
country and reached the headquarters of the former
government in Phnom Penh in just 15 days. CChanda , (19
January) 1979:101 The remainder of the unfortunate state
took somewhat longer to overrun with complete control still
lacking today in some areas. Ironicallv, Vietnam's
continuing efforts to consolidate their position in
Kampuchea ^re being hampered bv the same type o-f guerrilla

subversion that was long the - -stock-in-trade of the
Vietnamese themselves.
In their e-f -forts to settle the Kamouchean issue in
their -favor. Vietnam's current military target has often
been Thailand. While unlikely, Hanoi does have the militarv
capability to launch an overwhelming invasion o-f Thailand.
In 1965, Janice and William Fain o-f the Douglas
Aircraft Company, conducted a simulated invasion study of
Thailand, using a communist force configuration similar to
that available to Hanoi. Thev concluded that without
outside reinforcement, the Royal Thai Armv would be
overcome in less than thirty days.CFain, 1965] While the
present status of the Thai Armed Forces should enable them
to be somewhat more responsive to an invasion attempt todav,
sheer numbers of . Vi etnamese troops that could be committed
to such an e-frort would inevitably achieve the same results
in the 1960 's.
Vietnam current lv has onlv a limited capability to
project their power outside of the Indochina-Thailand border
arsa. While this precludes the immediate threat of
Vietnamese invasion of any of the other countries of ASEAN
at this time. this situation mav be raDidlv changing.
Continuing Soviet efforts to arm Vietnam with sophisticated
weapon systems could give Hanoi the necessary projection
capability in a very few vears. The Soviets are also
undoubtedly furthering Vietnam's capabilities in this
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regard bv building their data base of strategic intelligence
gathered from regular Soviet reconnaissance -flights based
out o-f Cam Ranh Bav.
One other area o-f potential Vietnamese threat to
ASEAN exists in the area of offshore territorial disputes.
Vietnam is in territorial contention concerning several
islands in the Spratly group, and offshore Continental Shelf
claims in the South China Sea as far south as the Natuna
Islands (See Appendix D, Map 4). As indicated previously.
Vietnam maintains only a limited capability to defend and
support the islands that it currently occupies in the
Spratlys. However, as the potential for oil and natural gas
exploitation grows in the area, Vietnamese ambitions mav
bring them into direct conflict with ASEAN contenders for
the same resources. Appendix D, Map 5 shows the range of
contestants presently occupying islands in the Spratlvs.
C. ASEAN 'S MILITARY RESPONSE.
ASEAN 's military response to Vietnam's conventional arms
buildup is tempered bv the fact that ASEAN is not a formal
military alliance. Therefore, military responses to the?
Indochinese threat have been technically pursued as
individual efforts. However, the pattern of independent,
action conducted by ASEAN members has been carefully
orchestrated to be complementary to group security goals.
The members o-f ASEAN use many informal mechanisms to achieve
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a unified position on security issues. Thus- while
preserving their image of a non-military alliance. ASEAN is
involved in manv military/security associations.
Militarv responses by ASEAN members to security threats
have historically been two-dimensional. The first
dimension is a well established web of interlocking
bilateral and multilateral security arrangements with
outside powers.
Thailand and the Philippines have maintained extensive
military aid and security ties with the United States since
the earlv 1950s. Both ^re signatories of the Manila Pact of
1954 which provided for mutual consultation and protection
between these countries and the United States, Australia,
New Zealand, and Great Britain. The Philippines is also
linked to the United States under a bilateral Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT) signed in 1951 . CChatham House, 19563
Malaysia and Singapore were parties to the Five Power
Defence Arrangement (FPDA) of 1971, which includes
Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain. Critical aspects
of this treaty include provision for an Integrated Air
Defence Svstem (IADS), Military Advisory Groups (MAGs) , and
participation in regular joint exercises. Australia and New
Zealand station token forces in both Malaysia and Singapore




Recently, Thailand has been mentioned as a patent ial
sixth member o-f the FPDA. While not a -former Commonwealth
country, Bangkok has expressed some interest in the FPDA in
regards to bolstering its position against Vietnamese and
Soviet expansionism in the region. C Indorf , (15 Seotember)
1983:28-29]
Brunei, the newest member o-f ASEAN, had a -formal
arrangement with Great Britain since 1959 -for its security
needs. Although independent since January 1984, Brunei
hosts a British Gurkha Regiment deployed at the oil fields
o-f Seria. C'Brunei » " 1983:633 This -force is in addition to
the small military force indigenous to the Kingdom.
Indonesia. is the only nation of ASEAN that has no formal
defense treaties with any other state. It does, however,
maintain several military aid agreements with other
countries including the United States, the Philippines, and
Singapore. CBunge, 1983:243-2443
The second dimension of ASEAN member's military response
is that of establishing unilateral security initiatives,
designed to link the various ASEAN states together on an
informal basis. The major initiatives presently underway
fall into four general cateaories:
1. Bilateral security agreements/exchanges, to include
periodic joint military exercises.




3. Armed -forces modernization"' programs. presently
underway in all of the ASEAN countries.
4. An attempt on the part of ASEAN members to standardize
newly procured weapon systems, all o-f which =rs being
obtained -from western sources.
Typical o-f the many in-formal security arrangements among
the ASEAN countries is the long standing cross-border
arrangement between Malaysia and Thailand. This
relationship is designed to combat communist insurgents
operating in the wilderness area separating their
countries. Malaysia has a similar arrangement with
Indonesia to combat subversive activity in East
Malaysia. CRau, 1982:28]
Singapore is another ASEAN country that maintains a
variety o-f special arrangements with other free Asian
nations. Singapore has had a role in assisting Thailand
with its counterinsurgencv efforts since at least the earlv
1970s. C Indorf , (September) 1933:351 Singapore also trains
many officers of other Asian nations. and maintains
facilities for this function in Brunei, Thailand. the
Phi 1 i Dpines.and Taiwan. [Singapore, 1983:201
Indonesia freguently participates in training programs
and operational exercises with ASEAN members and other
regional actors. Thev have been involved in exercises with
Australia, New Zealand, France, Great Britain, and India.
Indonesia also cooperates with Singapore on various

intelligence and security matters, fRichardson , (November)
1982:55:
In the area o-f strategic reoosi tioning , Thailand.
Malaysia, and Indonesia have undertaken unilateral steps to
present a mere credible defense to the Soviet-backed
Vietnamese threat. Thailand has. -for obvious reasons,
deployed most of its artillery and armored units closer to
the Thai-Kampuchean border since 1979. These units &ra
arranged in-depth to provide defensive blocking positions
along the most likely invasion routes between the border and
Bangkok.
Malaysia has likewise taken measures to improve its
forward defensive posture towards Indochina. Kuala Lumpur
has given some priority in recent years to upgrading the air
and naval facilities at Labuan in East Malaysi a. CNathan
.
1^80:783 This important base supports many of Malaysia's
security interests east of the Malav Peninsula. including
operations involving the nation's claims in the South China
Sea. Malaysia recently reinforced its territorial claims
these bv stationing troops on a small atoll of the Soratlv
Islands. Terumbu Layang Lavang. CDas , 1933:403 As Vietnamese
troops occupy islands only a short distance from Terumbu
Layang Layang, this represents Malaysia's most -Forward
deployment towards Indochina.
Indonesia has also improved its strategic posture.
Jakarta recently opened a major advance air and naval base
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on the island d+ Bunguran, in the Natuna Group. This base
(Ranai ) is an excellent earlv warning position, allowing
Indonesian forces surveillance and strike capability
throughout the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the South
China Sea. CHowarth , 1933:1751:] Ranai is located less than
450 miles south of mainland Vietnam.
Concerning modernization efforts, all of the ASEAN
countries ^re involved to some degree in programs to
improve the conventional effectiveness oi their respective
armed -forces. This has continued since atleast the mid-70s.
stimulated in large part bv the growing menace of Vietnam
and the Soviet presence in Indochina.
Following the 1979 Vietnamese invasion and occupation of
Kampuchea, all the ASEAN countries became seriouslv
interested their defenses. Some, such as Thailand and
Malaysia, have reason to feel directly threatened bv
Vietnam, vet the other members have been equal lv interested
in improving their defensive capabilities.
As an indicator of the timing and seriousness of this
interest. Table 1 1 -VI shows the military expenditures of the




ASEAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1975-1983
Thailand Malaysia Singapore Indonesia PhiliDDir.es
YEAR
531
Millions o-f U.S. Dollars
1975 688 325 1399 712
1976 632 647 380 1370 757
1977 745 849 464 1419 728
1978 800 723 442 1 404 556
1979 942 773 457 1784 643
1980 1100 1006 598 2100 779
1981 1310 1447 707 2690 362
1982 1437 2077 852 2926 378
1933 1562 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Note: n/a=figures not vet available.
SOURCES: World Military Expenditures and Arms Trans-fers 1971 -
1980, (March) 1983. Washington, D.C.sU.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency: 52-69: The Military Balance 1930. 1981.
1982, 1983-1984 , 1980-1983. London: The International
Institute -For Strategic Studies.
De-fense expenditures by all ASEAN governments increased
sharply just after 1979. While this rise may not be totally
attributable to Vietnam's conflicts during 1979, they must
must certainly account for a significant share. The most
dramatic rise in defense commitments has been that of
Malaysia's. with a total increase by 1932 of over 300
oercent of their 1975 spending. While figures for 1933 are
not available for all of the ASEAN countries. Thailand's
increase for 1933 is probably indicative of the continuing
spending trend towards more and better defensive weapon
svstems.

Figure 1 1-5. presents a graphic picture of total ASEAN
militarv expenditures from 1975 to 1982.
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Figure 1 1-5 Total ASEAN Def«n«e Expand! tur*a
As this graphic illustrates, military spending by ASEAN
countries rose to (U.S.) $8,170 billion dollars by 1982,
thus showing a total increase of over 200 percent of the
amount spent for the same purpose in 1975. This trend
appears to be continuing.
With the upgrading and purchase of new weapon systems,
the ASEAN states are also attempting to standardize their
individual arsenals. In the past, this was more the
offshoot of purchases from the same Western arms suppliers
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than from anv planned effort on the— part of ASEAN members.
This mav be changing, however, as a number of the countries
are voicing interest in integrating their military
equipment . [Richardson , (November) 1932:573
D. EXTERNAL MILITARY INTERESTS.
External militarv interests and policies in the region
can be divided into two basic categories: militarv
presence/physical assistance in the region, and military
aid. While manv countries can be listed as participating in
arms transactions with Southeast Asian nations, this
discussion will be limited to those di recti v involved in the
region as a military presence. This narrows the field to
four of the more significant external actors; Australia,
the United States, China, and the Soviet Union.
Australia maintains a permanent Air Squadron of MIRAGE
fighters, and a detachment of two P—3 ORION reconnaissance
aircraft at Butterworth, Malaysia. Butterworth is also the
headquarters of the Integrated Air Defence Svstem (IADS),
which is manned in part by Australian personnel. [Hewish,
1979:2193 Australia also stations up to eight Roval
Australian Air Force (RAAF) fighters at Tengah, Singapore,
on a rotating basis from Butterworth. Cibi d. , :220J While
not deploved in numbers that present a realistic deterrence
to regional threats, Australia's presence does represent a
tanoible link with Western powers.
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As provided under the Military Bases Agreements at 1974
and 1979, the United States maintains a substantial military
presence in the Philippines. The two most important bases
ar& Subic Bav, headquarters o-f the U.S. Seventh Fleet: and
Clark Air base, headquarters o-f the 13th Air Force.
Subic Bay plays host to between six and seven attack
aircraft carriers, 37 other major surface war -fare
combatants, 39 attack submarines, and 32 amphibious vessels.
The Seventh Fleet also operates several P-3C ORION
reconnaissance aircra-ft out o-f Cubi Point Naval Air Station.
Permanent American personnel stationed at Subic Bay nears
the 6,000 figure. CBerry, 1982:133
Clark Air Base is a major air logistics support facility
and the home station for several U.S. Air-farce squadrons.
It houses two fighter/interceptor squadrons of some 48 F-4E
PHANTOM fighters, 10 F-5 TIGER lis and four T-38A TALON
trainers, combined with a tactical airlift wing of 16 C-130
HERCULES, and three C-9A NIGHTINGALES. Clark also supports
an aerospace rescue and recovery sauadron of four HH—3E
JOLLY GREEN GIANTs. U.S. military personnel stationed
here number close to 8 ,000. [ibid. , : 123
Bevond the 1979 punitive invasion of Vietnam, China's
militarv involvement in Southeast Asia has been low—keyed in
the modern era. China had maintained 14-20,000 roadbuilding
personnel in northern Laos from at least the earlv 60s to
late in 1978. While the military orientation of this effort
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has been questioned. the road construction itself was
protected by antiaircraft artillery instal 1 ations. CWhi taker
.
1972:2613 Additionally, the military implications o-f this
road (which was planned to link China and the Laotian
capital o-f Vientiane) were extremely disturbing to ASEAN
countries, especially Thailand.
More recently, China's involvement has been confined to
material and training support to anti -government groups in
Laos, Kampuchea, and possiblv Vietnam. China has
allowed the establishment of several resistance camos near
the Lao border in southwest Yunnan Province. Groups such as
the Sip Song Panna Division, and the Daizu Zizhizhou (Thai
People's Autonomous Prefecture) &rB reportedly
headauartered here.CGunn, 1983:32111 Laotian guerrilla
leaders still active against the current Indochinese
governments such as Vang Pao, Kong Le , and Phoumi Novasan
all appear to be recieving some measure of support from
Bei jing. CChanda, (26 March) 1982:443
Continuing Chinese support to Kampuchean resistance
groups has probably been the most significant factor
sustaining military opposition in Kampuchea since 1979.
This support is mostlv limited to small arms and ammunition.
Though initially confined to the Khmer Rouge, Chinese
assistance has also been extended to the KPNLF and
Sihancukist exiles in recent months. A few Chinese
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"advisors" were stationed in Kampuchea during the Pol Pot
Khmer Rouge regime, and though unconfirmed, some mav still
be in Democratic Kampuchean (DK) camps todav.
Soviet involvement in the region was mostlv limited to
military aid and support to -friendlv non-communist, and
communist governments up to 1979. This circumstance then
changed when Vietnam granted Moscow major basing rights -for
air and naval assets o-f the Soviet Far East Fleet. This
developed in response to the Si no-Vietnamese conflict in
February, with Hanoi probably -feeling that Soviet presence
on Vietnamese soil would act as a substantial deterrent to
Chinese ambitions. By September 1979, the Soviets had at
least 15 warships on station 'at Cam Ranh Bay, and a
detachment of TU-95 BEAR and TU-16 BADGER reconnaissance
aircraft at Cam Ranh and Da Nang air bases. This militarv
presence has been in Vietnam ever since. Estimates of
Russian military and civilian advisors stationed in Vietnam
range from 5,000 to 8,000. CManthorpe , 1930:1171 Bv 19S0,
Soviet AN-12 CUB pilots were activelv engaged in flying
transport missions for Hanoi to include support to combat
troops inside Kampuchea. Also bv 1980. Soviet advisors were
active in both the Navy and the Air Force training
Vietnamese personnel for increased operational roles.
Russian specialists have also been noted in various
positions assisting the operation of major port -facilities,
such as those at Haiphona Harbor. CFBIS YB, (12 March) 198211
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Other Soviet projects in the area include the
construction o-f a communications monitoring station at Cam
Ranh Bav: a similar installation at Kompong Som. in
Kampuchea: and the conversion o-f the port facilitv at Ream.
Kampuchea into a deep water harbor . CHosmer and Wolfe.
19B3: 19D
E. SUMMARY.
Clearlv, the -Foregoing evidence shows that the current
balance o-f militarv power in Southeast Asia is heavilv
weighted towards the Indochina Bloc. Vietnam. under the
tutelage o-f the Soviet Union, has amassed militarv strength
-far in excess o-f that needed -for normal defensive curooses.
This, and the ideology of the men behind Vietnam's militarv
machine, present a "clear and present danger" to the
stability Southeast Asia.
While Hanoi's plans -for the future are unclear, its
military capabilities have put them in a Dosition to dictate
militarv terms when other methods of political manueverings
failed. As this will continue to be unacceptable to the
ASEAN states, some alternative must be found. The following
chapter on political mechanisms of interaction will address
this problem.

Ill- THE POLITICAL ARENA
Ass in the military arena of interactive national
interests, imbalance is characteristic o-f the political
arena also, Political power in Southeast Asia is unequally
divided between the two polar -Factions. This contributes to
regional instability, which increases the potential for war.
Unlike the military arena, however, the balance o-f power in
the political sphere o-f interaction has o-f ten been weighted
in -favor o-f the ASEAN countries. and against Indochina.
Vietnam is aware o-f its inadequacies in this arena and
frequently feels threatened by ASEAN 's political successes.
Additionally, Hanoi's leaders are subject to the same
misgivings about their neighbors that afflicts all communist
regimes. In essence, they are convinced that the rest of
the world is out to get them. Consequently, the potential
for instability in the region frequently rises in direct
proportion to the degree in which Vietnam/Indochina feels
threatened by ASEAN 's political maneuverings.
This chapter examines the nature of the present
political impasse in Southeast Asia through a discussion
comparing the governmental evolution of each faction, and
its current national interests. The diplomatic environment
is then examined in terms of the political threat that
ASEAN's policies represent to Vietnam/Indochina, followed by
a discussion ai Hanoi's strategy to counter this threat.
60

Finally. there is a brief look "at external political
interests and policies as they influence regional issues.
A. THE POLITICAL IMPASSE: A CONFLICT OF IDEOLOGIES.
Probably the most significant obstacle to resolution of
the di-f-ferences between ASEAN and Indochina today, is the
perception that each side holds towards political conduct in
pursuit o-f national interests. Stated another way, the
present impasse between ASEAN and Indochina is more or less
a -function of substantially differing ideologies. These
ideological differences extend to almost every aspect of
internal and external political activity.
1. The Political Heritage of ASEAN .
While the six countries of ASEAN have diverse
ethnic, cultural and linguistic backgrounds, thev share a
common heritage of traditionalist orientation and modern
western influence. Many cultural traditions extending back
thousands of vears are still verv important to ASEAN
societies today. Added to this is the institutional
influence that the West has imoarted over the last few
centuries. This combination of attributes has given the
governments of ASEAN a western ideological patina, which
overlays the natural harmony o-f traditional Southeast Asian
life styles. This means that the ASEAN countries subscribe
to an often loose centralization of political power,





ASEAN governments rely heavily on traditional
customs and ethics to insure a proper attitude o-f the
populace towards achieving national goals.
These countries have confidence in their own
abilities to govern themselves. Long standing historical
institutions o-F the paternal God-King, and/or dictatorial
strongman, greatly influence modern ASEAN governments. Most
of these systems still incorporate such elements of
leadership in varying degrees, in a unique blend of local
despotism and quasi -democracy. ASEAN governments are often
formed around the traditional paternal strongman who rules a
generally westernised open society, through a bureaucracy of
elites.
2. Vietnam's Political Heritage .
Vietnam, shares same of the same patterns of
government, but with variations. Vietnam has often been
subject to, or run by foreign domination for long periods of
time. China has been the main subjugating force in this
regard since at least 111 B.C., when Nam Viet was
incorporated into the Han Chinese Empire. CDui ker , 1983:153
During the frequently harsh thousand year rule of China ov^r
Vietnam, Chinese culture and political influence was
literally beaten into the often rebellious populace. During
this period of domination, Vietnam developed a mixture of
Confucian loyalty and Mencian rebelliousness. Strong
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characteristics of both of these factors are seen in the
Vietnamese ethos o-f todav.
Chinese influence may also account for the
traditional Vietnamese adherence to a centralized form o+
government. William Duiker, notes that modern Vietnamese
socialism "...like its Confucian predecessor, (has) found
much to imitate in its great neighbor,
China.
"
Cibid. ,: 1363 Additionally, Vietnam was frequentlv
divided into warring factions throughout its history, and
one or another faction was usually ruled by a dominant
family or emperor with dictatorial power. Thus, the current
obsessive Vietnamese concern with strict organization and
totalitarian rule is no stranger to Vietnam.
Vietnam's paranoia about external powers also has
historical roots. Besides fending off the Chinese, the
Vietnamese have often been involved in wars against other
expanding Southeast Asian cultures. In manv cases these
wars were prosecuted in an effort, not only to survive, but
to expand Vietnamese civilization. Vietnam has learned over
the centuries that the most assured guarantee of their
survival is to infiltrate, control, or eliminate one's
neighbors. This theme has been especially prevalent in
Hanoi's dealings with the Indochinese states of Laos and
Kampuchea. Vietnam has attempted to infiltrate and control
thesestates for several hundred years. Not surprisingly,




-foe. In addition to China.
Thailand has always been a major competitor -for the same
spheres o-f power as Vietnam. Considering the present
attitude o-f the Hanoi leadership, it is clear that the
perception o-f enemies on all sides is another characteristic
o-f Vietnamese thought that has survived to the modern era.
Vietnam does share at least one aspect o-f its
developmental experience with its ASEAN neighbors. This is
western colonial rule, that included all o-f Southeast Asia
with the exception o-f Thailand. For Vietnam this entailed
domination by the French -from approximately 1S83 to 1954.
For Southeast Asia in general, western colonialism
provided the impetus -for the creation o-f national liberation
movements in almost every country. While nationalism was
su-f-ficient -for the other emerging countries o-f the region,
it was not -for Vietnam. The parallel movement o-f world
communism captured the emerging Vietnamese nationalist
e-f-fort at a very early stage, resulting in a movement
dedicated not only to the liberation o-f Vietnam -from
colonial power but to the goals o-f communist world
domination. Nationalism was thus subverted to communism in
Vietnam. Consequentl v, the developmental similaritv between
Vietnam and the rest o-f Southeast Asia begins with the
common roots o-f nationalism, and ends with the emergence o-f
communism. Vietnam's conduct, since the communist
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assumed power in North Vietnam in -1954, has been a textbook
case of classic communist war-fare against all of its
immediate nationalist neighbors.
3. Physical Manifestations .
As noted, the political scene in Southeast Asia is a
product o-f two very different patterns of ideological
evolution. Situations such as the Vietnamese occupation
of Kampuchea, mass migrations of unwanted Indochinese
refugees, and punitive border incursions against Thailand
are manifestations of this ideological difference. While
these differences are freguently regarded as causing the
current impasse between Indochina and ASEAN they are only
the physical indicators of basically fundamental differences
in ideology.
It is apparent that solving the current regional
problems will necessitate taking ideological motivations and
imperatives into account before any resolution of these
problems can be successful.
B. CURRENT NATIONAL INTERESTS.
1. ASEAN 's Collective Interests .
When discussing the national interests of ASEAN a
distinction must be made at the outset between those that
are collective aspirations, and those that are individually





ASEAN's collective political interests can be
divided into two general categories; long-range, and short-
range interests, Long-range interests encompass ASEAN's
perspective of itself as an orgnizatian, and its hopes and
considerations -for the -future of the region. These
considerations/interests include the following:
1. The Right of Self-Determinati on. A major objective of
ASEAN is to establish and preserve the right of individual
states to maintain their territorial integritv. national
ideals, and political independence. This sentiment is on
record in the 1976 ASEAN Treatv of Amity and Co-operation,
the principles of which are included in Chapter I, under
ASEAN's Development. Implied in this goal is the
willingness on ASEAN's part to attempt to neutralize and or
eliminate threats to this basic security interest, whether
of a subversive or overt nature. That the membership whole
heartedly supports this objective is apparent in their
vehement opposition to the Vietnamese occupation of
Kampuchea. While ASEAN is limited in their methods of
policy implementation, which will be discussed shortiv. they
focus much of their political clout on trying to solve this
particular problem. National freedom of action is clearly a
significant aim of ASEAN.
2. Avoiding Great Power Entanglements. ASEAN has no
interest in becoming involved in the power politics of the
"Great Powers." Bevond the danger of nuclear war. oast
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experience has shown ASEAN states that political balance in
the region is best achieved with a minimum o-f outside
inter -f erence. This idea is expressed most appropri atel v in
the 1971 ASEAN declaration o-f a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and
Neutrality" (See Chapter I for further elaboration on this
pronouncement). In essence, ASEAN advocates low-profile
visibility for external actors in regional affairs to
minimise conflict that has historically been inspired by
outside powers.
3. To Promote Regional Peace and Stability. Included in
the founding concepts of the organization, the desire for
regional peace and stability summarises elements of the
other long-range political goals of ASEAN. The membership
of ASEAN subscribe to an "...abiding respect for justice and
the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the
region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations
charter. "CEurooa, 1982-83:121: Such adherence has so far
been their greatest regional strength in attemoting to
obtain peace and stability to date.
ASEAN 's short-range interests are much less
complicated, as they revolve around a single objective: to
dissuade or prevent communist advances which erode their
long-range common interests.
In this regard the current most important ASEAN
mission is to bring about a satisfactory resolution of the
Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. Of lesser emphasis is
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the cantining effort to limit/eliminate internal subversion
and potential military threats to member nations. such as
that posed by Indochina against Thailand. For ASEAN the
priority o-f their immediate interests changes in response to
the current communist threat. This by definition includes
potential threats -from China, and the Soviet Union as well
as the immediate threat o-f Vietnam/Indochina.
2. Indochina's Vietnamese Interests .
Vietnam's political interests revolve around several
specifically de-fined goals. For purposes o-f comparison
these objectives will be divided into the same long-range
and short-range categories as ASEAN interests.
Long-range Vietnamese interests must be further
separated out to differentiate between propaganda positions,
and actual Vietnamese ambitions. In this process of
translation, two major strategic propaganda goals can be
included as sianificant Vietnamese interests:
1. "Solidarity and all-round co-operation with the
Soviet Union." Vietnamese General Secretary of the
Central Committee Le Duan , speaking at the Fifth
Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party Congress
in 1932 stated that this principle has "alwavs been
the cornerstone of our party's and state's foreign
policy." CThaver, (11-14 April) 1983:283
2. Consolidation of the "special Vi etnam-Laos-
Kampuchean relationship." During the same congress
Le Duan stressed the evolutionary law of the
revolution in the three countries," adding that the
success of this "special relationship" is a "matter






Certainlv the Hanoi leadership oercieves that this is a
matter -for the survival of Vietnam. The survival o-f the
other. -formerly independent countries o-f Indochina is
somewhat less certain.
Translating these strategic platitudes into
realistic long-range interests. the following five
Vietnamese objectives have been proposed by Lee Dutter and
Ravmond Kania based on extractions from the Vietnamese
press. t Dutter, 1980:932-9333 Fundamental Vietnamese
interests arsz
1. To gain "political independence from all non-
Vietnamese influences.
"
2. To gain "as far as possible, independence from
foreign sources of economic and or military aid
and materi al .
"
3. To establish and preserve the "territorial
integrity and unity of ethnic Vietnamese
peoples." As Dutter and Kania put it," to
gather all ethnic Vietnamese into one political
territorial unit," to achieve "the ethnic
purification of such a unit."
4. To achieve "military security from anv potential
or real threat, attacks or invasions."
5. To make the Socialist Republic of Vietnam "into
a regional power in Southeast Asia through the
achievement of the first four goals and
domination of the SRV ' s immediate neighbors to
the west.
"
Though seemingly a contradiction of the previously
stated goal of co-operation and solidarity with the Soviet
Union, political independence from all non-Vietnamese
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influences is a realistic nationalist aspiration. It is to
be expected that Hanoi would as soon be rid of their
dependence on the Soviet Union as they would the rest of the
external powers. At the very least it is probablv sate to
assume that Vietnam would like to limit external "Great
Power" involvement in a region they wish to dominate. The
second objective ties in with this consideration. Certainlv
the increasing dependence on -foreign (Soviet) resources must
wear on the Vietnamese leadership. True independence can
never be achieved under such circumstances.
Goal three, establishing and perserving the
"territorial integrity and unity of ethnic Vienamese
people", and goal four, achieving "military security -from
any potential or real threat, attacks or invasions", am
similar in that they both express the desire to unity
Vietnam into a whole. The most threatening military -force
in this regard is of course that of China, with a smaller
threat posed by ASEAN supported insurgency.
The fifth Vietnamese interest, making Vietnam into a
regional power in Southeast Asia, is daily becoming more
aooarent as the overall goal of the present leadership. In
some circles it has even been refered to as Vietnam's
"Imperial Ambition." In fact, it appears to be of such
overwhelming importance as to override all other
considerations of foreign policy, and internal development.
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Concerning the matter of ~ ^short-range interests,
these Vietnamese goals have been laid out by Douglas Pike in
his paper on Hanoi's intentions for the 1980 's. CPike,
1981:43 Among the goals that he indicates Vietnam is
interested in ares
1. The objective of securing "a pliant and non-
threatening region; above all this applies to the
Indochina peninsula."
2. "...to prevent the development o-f an anti-
communist -front, either a militant ASEAN, a revised
SEATO or some other regional Grouping hostile to
Vietnam.
"
Additional Vietnamese short-range interests as identified bv
Kania and Dutter CDutter, 1980:9343 are listed below:
3. The expulsion o-f extra—regional influences -from
Indochina.
4. "Obtaining aid -from all available sources for
reconstruction and economic development," as well as
for "military strength and security."
5. "The expulsion of dissidents so as not to impede
economic, political, and social development,"
6. "Acquisition and maintenance of a preponderance
of influence over the domestic and foreign affairs
of Laos and Cambodia (Kampuchea)."
7. "The increase of Vietnamese influence in
northeast Thailand so as to hold that traditional
enemv at bav.
"
C. THE ASEAN POLITICAL THREAT TO INDOCHINA.
In spite oi external threats from China and the U.S.,
Hanoi percieves ASEAN and its membership as the principle
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political threat to communist Indochina's survival and
sovereignty,
1- The Threat to Vietnam .
The political threat posed to Vietnam through ASEAN
policy, exists in at least two dimensions: ideological
threats that are percieved by Vietnam, but which mav have
only a tenuous basis in reality; and actual threats o-f a
more substantive nature.
Ideological struggle between the -forces o-f
Vietnamese socialism and ASEAN capitalism as defined bv
Marxist theory fit into the -former category. Douglas Pike
points out that "the o-f-ficial Hanoi" view is that the
governments and societies of ASEAN ars neither legitimate
nor durable. "[Pike, (Summer) 1983:473 Hanoi's repudiation
of the ASEAN government's legal . and enduring nature
signifies that Vietnam percieves them to be threats to the
legitimate communist forces of "progress and reaction."
Pike sums up this attitude by concluding that, "the peoples
of the ASEAN region should make no mistake about it,
entertain no illusions — Hanoi regards them and their
svstem as the ideological enemy.
"
Cibi d. , :4SJ
Another facet of the ideological threat that Vietnam
feels from ASEAN is in the area of capitalist tendencies on
the part of the so-called loval cadre. While this will be
further elaborated on in the chapter on economics, suffice
it to sav here that Hanoi is concerned about its socialist

economic failures and the temptations of capitalism that Are
introduced -from neighboring ASEAN countries. In manv cases.
Vietnam blames its own economic
-failures and the tendency of
its population towards free market enterprize on ASEAN
attempts to undermine its socialist institutions.
The ideological threat to Vietnam is a threat
against the very fabric of socialist orthodoxy, which is
focused mostly in the immediate confines of Hanoi. While
the validity, and degree of seriousness of this threat is
subject to interpretation from the outside, there is no
doubt that it will remain a real consideration for the
policy makers in Hanoi for some time to come.
2. The Threat to Vietnamese Kampuchea .
Beyond mundane ideological considerations that
constantly worry the communist leadership, Hanoi is also
concerned with more substantive political threats. The
largest of these dangers is that of the continuing
resistance on the part of ASEAN to recognise Vietnamese
suzerainty over Kampuchea. This problem has been especially
bothersome since the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in
1979.
The ASEAN threat to Kampuchea takes two forms:
political maneuvering in international forums to isolate and
bring sanctions against Vietnam: and local support. to
include arms and other physical assistance to exile
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Kampuchean groups which conduct- subversive operations
against the Vietnamese.
Since 1979, ASEAN has waged a very successful
political campaign in the international media to raise
sanctions against Hanoi. Through political agility in the
United Nations and other international -forums, ASEAN has
been able to convince the rest o-f the world that Vietnam's
position in Kampuchea is that o-f a foreign occupyina power.
Thus, while Hanoi insists that the Vietnamese presence in
Kampuchea is based on legitimate humanistic and security
considerations, ASEAN continues to hold sway over
international opinion. In this manner they have
successfully managed to politically isolate Vietnam -from the
international recognition and western support that it so
desperately needs. Les Bussynski has summed the situation
up in his statement that, "...ASEAN has the power to confer
or deny legitimacy to the Vietnamese-sponsored regime in
Kampuchea: and it is this legitimacy that Vietnam
courts. "CBuszynski , 1984:29: While this kind of pressure
has not succeeded in farcing the Vietnamese out of Kampuchea
to date, it has significantly limited the scone of their
activities. As a direct result of ASEAN's machinations
since 1979, Vietnam has been a regional and international
"basket case" in both the political and economic arenas.
Another aspect of the ASEAN threat to
Vietnam/ Indochina exists in the form of support given to
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exiled and internal resistance groups for purposes of
subversion. This support is rendered by political
endorsement and assistance, and arms transfers.
ASEAN 's efforts to politically bolster resistance to
Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea has been oriented around
the -following major objectives: to maintain the legal right
o-f the government o-f Democratic Kampuchea to be the sole
Kampuchean representative at the United Nations: to bring
about an international conference on Kampuchea under U.N.
auspices: and to encourage the formation of a united front
government among the exile Kampuchean resistance
forces. [Soon, 1932:5493 ASEAN has experienced mixed
success in achieving these tasks.
In the United Nations. ASEAN has so far had a
perfect record concerning the continued U.N. endorsement of
legitimacy for the Coalition Government of Democratic
Kampuchea (CSDK) . October 20th of 1983 marked the fifth
consecutive year that ASEAN has been able to marshal the
necessary votes for its candidate to remain in the U.N.
Kampuchean seat. Equally important to ASEAN 's long term
success, though, are indications that Hanoi and Moscow are
gradual Iv losing ground in their annual efforts to install
their puppet candidate, the People's Republic of Kampuchea
(PRK) , in the U.N. seat. U.N. voting against the Hanoi-
Moscow candidate has increased from 71 in 1979, to 90 in
1982. Z Indochina Chronoloqv, (October—December) 1983:12-133
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ASEAN attempts to bring -t-he Kampuchean ausstion
under U.N. control has met with somewhat less success.
ASEAN managed to convene an International Conference on
Kampuchea (ICK) in Julv 1981, but little has came of the
pronouncements arrived at during this meeting. Essentially,
the points endorsed by the U.N. conference have been
unacceptable to Vietnam, who has since (in Vientiane in
1932) presented her own conditions -for resolution o-f the
Kampuchean problem.
While there Are obviously more important issues to
be discussed and resolved between ASEAN and Indochina on the
Kampuchean problem, such minutia as the -format and
sponsorship o-f any potential conference have been among the
more crucial initial stumbling blocks. ASEAN advocates a
United Nations sponsored conference, with open participation
by all concerned parties. Hanoi insists upon regional
discussions only, with equally limited participation by
ore-approved representatives. Such -foot—dragging not only
illustrates a characteristic tactic o-f Hanoi, (that o-f
delaving when in a weak position) but also points-up their
current unwillingness to negotiate. The Vietnamese
leadership is convinced that their position in Kampuchea
is totally legitimate. Also, having learned -from experience
that obstinacv works against a superior -foe. Hanoi is
apparently convinced that time will overcome resistance to
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their political position. Table IIT-1 outlines the general
position o-f both sides on the Kampuchean question.
TABLE III-I
OPPOSING POLITICAL PROPOSALS FOR THE RESOLUTION
OF THE KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM
ASEAN
Cease-fire by all parties
& withdrawal of all -for-
eign armed -forces in the
shortest time possible
with veri -fi cation.
U.N. supervised -free
elections with measures
to insure no interference
in election outcomes.
U.N. peacekeeping force to
insure law and order and
prevention o-f armed Kamou—
chean elements from seiz-







will not be a threat to
any of its neighbors.




Total withdrawal of Vietnamese
troops from Kampuchea after
the threat of Chinese, American
?*. other reactionary forces
disappears.
Recognition of a U.N. role in
the settlement if it withdraws
recognition of CGDK ?•< leaves
the U.N. Kampuchean seat open.
Establishment of a safetv zone
along Thai -Kampuchean border.
Remove all anti—Heng Samrin
combatants and refugees from
the Thai side of the zone.
Vietnamese troops would remain
out of the zone, but in all of
the rest of Kampuchea.
Establishment of a Viet-Thai
non—aggressi Gn pact.
Partial withdrawal of Viet
troops after China stops
assisting exile insurgents.
A regional conference between
ASEAN and Indochina.
SOURCES: Lau Tei k Soon, "ASEAN and the Cambodian Problem,"
Asian Survev, (June) 1982: 549-550; FBIS YB. (7 Julv) 19S2:A2.
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Another significant obstacle to agreement on
resolution is that of the Vietnamese proposal to establish a
"safety zone" on both sides of the Thai -Kampuchean border.
orior to any talks taking place. While Vietnam clearly has
no intention of taking its case to a United Nations world
assemblage that has gone on record as being critical of
Vietnamese actions inside Kampuchea, Thailand is even less
likely to allow part of its soil to be used as a common
no—man's land.
Though there s.rs few positive signs of a political
solution to Kampuchea, the fact that Vietnam continues to be
on the defensive in this arena, suggests that ASEAN still
holds the upper hand as far as maintaining a superior
political position is concerned.
Concerning ASEAN ' s attempts to form a unified front
of the exile Kampuchean forces, success here has also been
somewhat qualified. It is to be noted that the CGDK itself
was agreed upon only after protracted negotiations involving
the ASEAN states, China and the various independent
resistance groups. The present coalition government was
farmed on 22 June 1982.
Kev members and their respective positions in the
exile Government of Kampuchea are shown in Figure III— 1.
78

THE COALITION GOVERNMENT OF
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA
President and Designated Chief-of -State :
Prince Norodom Sihanouk - Also leader o-f MOULINAKA.
Vice President (-For Foreign Affairs) :
Khieu Sampham - Also leader o-f DK/KHMER ROUGE.
Prime Minister :
Son Sann - Also leader o-f KPNLF.
Finance and Economy Coordination Committee :
Ieng Sary - Also Deputy Prime Minister KHMER ROUGE.
Bour Hell
Boun Say
De-fense Coordination Committee :
Son Sen - Also Deputy PM -for Natl. De-f . KHMER ROUGE.
Im Chhoodeth
In Tarn - A Former Premier of the Lon Nol government.
Culture and Education Coordination Committee :
Thunc Rien - Also Secretary of Info, for KHMER ROUGE.
Chak Saroeun
Chhoy Vy
Health and Social Affairs Coordination Committee :
Dr. Thiouan Thioen - Also Min. Health for KHMER ROUGE.
Dr. Bou Kheng
Prince Norodom Chakrapong
SOURCES: Indochina Chronology . (January-March) 1982:10-11;
(July-SeDtember) 1982:9.
Figure III-l. Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
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This government in exile "was -formed -from the three
largest Kampuchean resistance factions: the Sihanouk force
of MOULINAKA, consisting of approximate! y 5,000 fighting
men; the Son Sann KHMER PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
(KPNLF)
, with approximately 12,000 troops; and the Khieu
Safliphan KHMER ROUGE/DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (DK) forces with
maybe 40,000 armed soldiers.
While the formation of the CGDK has orovided a legal
focus for regional apposition to the Vietnamese occupation
it has many internal problems that still prevent its smooth
and effective operation. One of the primary obstacles to
its current effectiveness is that each faction continues to
exercise independent action with little consultation with
the coalition government. Under the original terms of the
coalition all (then) • existing parties were to retain their
independence, but all decisions were to be undertaken bv
concensus. CEuropa , 1932-1963:623] This provision has only
worked in principle. Although central leadership and
direction has yet to be firmly established, the CGDK remains
the current legal Kampuchean representation to the United
Nati ons.
Another problem with the coalition exists in the
"bad blood" that is present between some of the groups.
Past atrocities committed bv the Khmer Rouge when thev were
in power in Kampuchea have not been forgiven by other
groups. Staff meetings held between the CGDK government and
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Khmer Rouge members must be held in Khmer Rouge territory
because o-f the danger of the communists being assassinated
in the other camps. CTasker
. 1984:333 While the existence
o-f the CGDK is a step in the right direction -for ASEAN,
considerable work is yet to be done to make it a truly
viable mechanism of Vietnamese opposition.
Concerning arms transfers and material support o-f
ASEAN to the exile groups, although the majority o-f arms
come -from China, individual members o-f ASEAN have sent arms
and equipment on occasion. Singapore has been the most
-forthcoming in this regard. Singapore's material support
has extended to items as large as a radio transmitting
station, which was delivered to the KPNLF in 1983 -for daily
broadcasting of -free Kampuchean information/propaganda.
C Indochina Chronology , (July-September) 1933:93
Other ASEAN assistance to arms support operations
usually assumes the -form o-f lending their territory and good
o-f -f ices to assist transshipment of arms -from other sources.
Vietnam has complained bitterly and often against Thailand
in regards to their constant support of this tvoe of
activity. Nevertheless, Thailand will probably continue
this level of assistance as long as the current situation
remains as it is.
As for the rest of the ASEAN countries, public
admissions of physical support to the Kamouchean resistance
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have been studiously avoided. Whi le" others may, in -fact, be
suDplving some -form o-f help, Thailand and Singapore aooear
to be the main players in this endeavor.
3. The Threat to Laos .
The threat to Laos that is posed by ASEAN is mostly
con-fined to the economic impact o-f political isolation.
Though Laos is dependent on Vietnam -for militarv and
political direction, they must turn to Thailand tor the
li-feblood o-f their economy. Thus, the relationship between
Laos and ASEAN is as critical to Vientiane's survival as
their relationship with Vietnam.
It is the very nature o-f this highly dependent
situation that is ever a threat to communist Laos. Thailand
has illustrated this -fact several times in the oast bv
closing their common borders and strangling Laos' commerce.
This has mostly been implemented as a result of political
motivations, such as minor border skirmishes. However,
Bangkok has not been above using their economic hold over
Vientiane to achieve desirable concessions on other issues.
Thailand correctly sees this mechanism as their most
e-f-fective method o-f keeping Vietnamese influence in Laos
under some measure o-f control .
D. VIETNAM'S COORDINATED COUNTER-STRATEGY.
Hanoi has several methods it can use to combat ASEAN 's
political prowess. Bevond the standard use o+ their
8:

military arm -for intimidation, Vietnam's diplomatic response
to the threat has been aimed at disrupting ASEAN unity, and
separating them from their base of "Great Power" supporters.
To accomplish this task they have used a policy of what
Douglas Pike has described as the "psvcho-pol i tical
"
approach. CPi ke, (Summer) 1983:16]
1
•
The Psycho-Political Approach .
The psvcho-pol i tical approach consists of holding
ASEAN's attention with political "carrots" while
periodically employing the military "stick" to coerce them
into compliance with Hanoi's wishes. Like most strategies
used against ASEAN, this one has been a coordinated effort
between all three Indochinese states.
Indochinese use of this strategy has been, conducted
in two phases. The first phase consists of maintaining a
regional dialogue with the individual members of ASEAN.
This accomplishes two important functions, it allows Hanoi
to sow seeds of discord between the separate states, and it
helps to reduce ASEAN's conesi veness. especially towards
formulating a harder line position against Hanoi. As
Leszek Buszynski puts it:
"...Vietnam's effort to aooroach ASEAN hinges upon
upon an attempt to influence the development of
opinion within ASEAN towards itself in the hone that
that ASEAN as a group will accept the view of the
the moderate members to the effect that it has a
stake in Vietnam's ability to maintain itself
against its enemy. " CBuszvnski , 1983:1013
8:

Evidence of this approach is visible in the hv.s-/
schedule of Vietnamese Minister of Foreign A-f -fairs Nguyen Co
Thach. Thach is constantly shuttling about the region
presenting the appearance of Hanoi's willingness to discuss
problems, but offering little in the wav o-f realistic
solutions. Thach wastes very -few opportunities to play one
ASEAN country against another, which he has done verv
e-f-fecti vely at times during the past. Examples o-f this tvoe
o-f maneuver include the careful wooing o-f Indonesia's
military chief, Bennv Murdani
,
getting him to speak out
publicly against ASEAN 's position on Kampuchea. CAwanchara,
(29 March) 1934:15: Also the April disclosure of
Singaporean trade ties with Vietnam, which serves to
discredit Singapore's hard-line stance against
Hanoi . CKulkarni , (5 April) 1984:543 Both of these cases
a.r^ prime examples of Vietnam's continuing efforts to drive
a wedge between the ASEAN alignment and decrease their
regional effectiveness against Hanoi.
The other phase of psycho—pol itical defense against
ASEAN falls under the general category of intimidation.
According to Douglas Pike, Hanoi will gradual lv attempt to:
"...induce and coerce the ASEAN countries to cut
their ties with the capitalist world (and the
multinational corporations which Hanoi holds to be
even more odious) in exchange for regional harmony,
and as the only wav ASEAN can ever get regional
harmony ." CPi ke, (Summer) 1983:163
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What Pike describes as Hanoi's long-range strategy-
is that Vietnam will o-f-fer peaceful coexi stance (under the
guise c-f "true" nationalism) in exchange -for reduction o-f
dependence on any external power. On the surface this
proposition sounds very attractive, however, underlying the
surface is the question of dominance in the region. Given
the western /Japanese sources of ASEAN 's current
organizational strengths (especially economic prosperitv) it
seems apparent that Vietnam would be the preeminent power
under such an arrangement. Therefore this phase of Hanoi's
policy responses to ASEAN would not appear to have much
chance of success.
E. THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL POLITICAL INTERESTS.
In addition to confrontation between ASEAN and
Indochina, the major external powers of China, the Soviet
Union. Japan, and the United States have interests which
impact directly on regional conflicts. Since Japan's
interests are mostly limited to economic issues, the other
three "Great Powers" will form the basis of this discussion.
1
. Regional Alignments .
An examination of external interests and policies
must be prefaced by a few words on regional alignments.
Post WWII alignments were clearlv delineated for manv years
between communist and non-communi st powers. This has
changed in recent times due to the warming of U.S. and
SI

Chinese relations, making the boundaries of regional
interactive interests less clearly demarcated. Since at
least 1945. the status o-f U.S. and Chinese relationships has
-Frequently played a critical role in the alignments o-f all
Southeast Asian actors.
Current political alignments in Southeast Asia
include the United States and China backing the Association
o-f Southeast Asian Nations, and the Soviet Union
behind Vietnam.
2. China's Interests and Policies .
Current Chinese policy in Southeast Asia may seem
puzzling to the casual observer who witnessed the support
given by Bei iing to Hanoi at the height o-f the Vietnam War.
Today, the ally has become the enemy. Furthermore, China
has come full circle from a position of supporting insurgent
groups against the ASEAN governments, to presently
supporting the Kampuchean insurgencv against Vietnam and
alignment with ASEAN. While seemingly contradictory this
reversal of policy is consistant with China's long-range
strategic interests.
China's interests in Southeast Asia have alwavs been
oriented around the guiding principle of keeping the region
harmless to wider Chinese objectives. This has been
tradi ti onal 1 v expressed by their policy "to intervene in




1982:43 This includes defeating attempts bv extra-regional
powers to use Southeast Asia in a strategy of encirclement
and isolation.
When China's interests were threatened by the United
States during the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing's Dolicv was
designed to undermine governments that supported the
American Dower base. The retreat from Vietnam. the
reduction of U.S. military forces in the region by the mid—
70s, combined with normalization between China and the
United States in 1979, decreased the threat oosed by America
and paved the way for better relations with the ASEAN
countries.
Since China's interests are currently threatened bv
the Soviet-Vietnamese alignment, Beijing has focused its
energies on undermining Hanoi, the regional power base of
the Soviet Union. These policies have taken the form of
"...unremitting hostility, maintaining military pressure on
the Vietnamese and Laotian borders and continuing to supply,
through Thailand, the Khmer Rouge-led resi stance. .." CSimon
,
(3 March) 1983:3043 The Thai connection, and U.S. backing
of Beijing's Kampuchean stance, has further increased the
imoortancs of China's current alignment with ASEAN.
A note of caution exists in this rel ati onshi d ,
however. Although China is presently supporting ASEAN '
s
position against Vietnam, such a stand could feasablv be
reversed aiven the riqht political motivations. The
87

potential threat of such a manuevsr acts in part to
encourage ASEAN in directions
-favored bv Beijing. In this
regard, anv talk o-f possible bilateral negotiations between
ASEAN and Indochina has been hastily reproved bv Beijina as
being against regional (read Chinese) interests at this
time. Such communications carrv implicit undertones of
warning to ASEAN countries, that conditions could change in
their relationship should ASEAN oppose China's wishes.
Nevertheless. ASEAN must keen a constant watch on
both regional and international events to preclude being
caught unawares on the wrong side o-f "Great Power"
manueveri ngs. Even with this precaution, the eventual
survival of Southeast Asian governments may one dav rest on
events external to their control • or influence. The
political manueveri ngs o-f China and the other "great powers"
are indicative o-f the sometimes helpless situation in
which Southeast Asia -finds itself. Long-range planning by
the ASEAN states must take China's shifting policies into
account and not rely too heavily on the present atmosphere
of political hospitality. For geopolitical reasons alone,
China will alwavs be a potential threat in all arenas, to
the interests of Southeast Asian nations.
3. The Soviet Union's Position .
Soviet objectives in Southeast Asia have likewise
remained constant over the years. Thev have sought to gain
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influence and strategic position at the expense at all o-f
the other Dowers of the region. On the party level, thev
have sought to weaken indigenous capitalist governments and
their external backers by providing support to insurgencies
wherever they could be developed. On the state level thev
have attempted to portray themselves as a benefactorv
nation, soley concerned with the development o-f peace,
stability, and brotherhood in a hostile world.
The Soviet Union has played the power game in
Southeast Asia -from a geopolitical, rather than regional
perspective. Paramount to Moscow's success has been their
ability to limit the comparative advantage o-f both the
United States and China in the region. This objective has
been accomplished most handily since the 1975 retreat o-f
American military power -from mainland Southeast Asia,
-followed by the alienation of China towards Vietnam by 1979.
As the primary supporter o-f Vietnamese expansionism since
the 1973 Treaty o-f Friendship and Co-ODeration was signed.
Moscow has maintained a prominent position in the region.
The Treaty o-f Friendship authorized the Soviets to establish
strategic military -facilities throughout Vietnam and
Indochina, thus allowing a significant extension of Soviet
power and influence.
The Soviet presence in Indochina has increased the
ootential military and political threat to ASEAN from overt
sources, but has decreased the previous threat of covert
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insurgency. The trade-off has been comforting in some
respects. vet alarming in others. From a strategic
perspective, the Soviet presence poses a potential threat to
-free-world shipping lanes and the passage of vital supplies
in time o-f war. On the other hand, the Soviet presence acts
as a counterbalance to Chinese aspirations in the ^rsA.
On a tactical level, Russian presence throughout Indochina
increases the potential for conflict due to external
pressures, while furthering the spread of foreign
directed communism. Moscow's phvsical presence also acts to
further their direct influence on regional events, while
they assist Hanoi to maintain its iron grip on the enslaved
states of Kampuchea and Laos. Manv ASEAN members fear that
the longer the Soviets remain in Indochina. the stronger
their hold on Hanoi will become. eventual lv resulting in a
puopet Indochinese bloc and a dominant Soviet voice in
Southeast Asian affairs.
4. The United State's Interests and Policies .
U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia have traditionally
been linked to both security and economic interests.
Security interests include limiting the influence of the
Soviets and their allies in the region, while maintaining
rights of access to the region for itself and other allied
powers. Economic interests include support for private
Americans enaaaed in free market enterorize and the
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development of interactive markets "for the enrichment of all
concerned. Since 1975, economic objectives have taken
priori tv in American Policy towards the area.
Since the mid-70s the United States has pursued a
oolicy of lower military visibility in Southeast Asia.
Washington has preferred to expand economic ties with the
region while supoorting local security efforts with military
aid and political backing. This arrangement has been as
well recieved bv the members of ASEAN as it has with China.
Accordingly, the lack of a threatening military aDoearance
has often increased American credibility in the region. In
this respect, the "...United States has made its policies
subordinate to (and integrated into) its relations with the
ASEAN countries and China. "CPike, (April) 1983:146] While
not totallv satisfactory from the standpoint of being able
to directly influence regional events, Washington aooears
comfortable with this policy at this time. Failing
confrontation with the Soviet Union on a global scale,
American interests and policies will probably remain low-
keyed in Southeast Asia for at least the remainder of this
century.
F. SUMMARY.
The political arena of interactive national interests
and policies accounts for the same type of fragility
inherent in the military situation in Southeast Asia.
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Currently the balance o-f power- —rests with the ASEAN
countries and against Indochina and Vietnam, but there is no
guarantee that it will remain so inde-f ini tel v. At this time
no great changes seem likelv because o-f almost universal
acceptance o-f the status quo. It must be recognized
however, that a -frustrated, isolated Hanoi mav someday
become determined to redress this untenable situation.
Therein lies the greatest possibility -for increased
instabilitv and possibly outright war. In such a
circumstance mere equitable distribution o-f political power




IV. THE ECONOMIC- ARENA
The last arena of interactive interests and policy to ce
discussed is the economies o-f ASEAN and Indochina. In this
important arena, the balance o-f economic power in Southeast
Asia is heavily weighted against the non-market economies o-f
Vietnam and the other Indochinese states. A combination c-f
prolonged wartime dependency and post-war emDhasis on
"socialist trans-formation" o-f the economy (from capitalism
to socialism) have led to conditions of stagnation and near
zero growth in these countries. Today, Indochina represents
the depressing results o-f a non-market economy that has been
driven in the past by ideology, rather than the laws o-f
supply and demand.
On the other hand, the market economies o-f the ASEAN
states have blossomed in recent years, enjoying unparalled
levels o-f regional growth. This has been accomplished
through cooperative behavior, a belief in laissez fairs and
active participation in the greater world economy. ASEAN
represents the epitome of a successful market economy.
While ASEAN 's successes and Indochina's failures have
been frequently attributed to the relative merits of their
particular philosophies, the fact remains that lack of
balance between the two economic spheres contributes to
regional instability. Southeast Asia is a classic example
of the "haves" and "have-nots." In this reaard, the longer
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this imbalance continues, the greater the potential for the
militarilv superior have-nots to remedy their problems
through military means.
This chapter examines the economic dichotomy that
characterizes Southeast Asia today. It explores the
background of the region by comparing and contrasting the
two opposing systems in terms of their evolution, current
status, and individual national economies. International
trade is addressed, along with foreign aid and interactive
local trade. The chapter concludes with a few words on the
prospects for increased bilateral or multilateral
cooperation between Indochina and ASEAN.
A. REGIONAL ECONOMIC BACKGROUNDS.
The roots of both ASEAN 's and Indochina's economic
systems can be found in the Dost-WWII quests -for
independence and statehood in Southeast Asia. The ideals
of nationalism motivated the political drive for countrv.
while the communist methodology employed laid the framework
for subsequent economic policies. In Indochina. for
example, nationalist goals were used to mobilize the
population while communism provided the mechanism to attain
those goals- In the ASEAN countries, nationalist goals were
achieved through mechanisms of both nationalism and
capitalism. Although separate vehicles were employed to
accomplish similar ends, the philosophy/ideology of the two
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systems is incompatible. Nevertheless, though the present
conflict o-f economic systems might be thought o-f as simply a
fundamental difference between communist and capitalist
methods, in actuality the difference is much more complex.
The following examination of the development of the two
economic systems should show some of the depth of this
complexity.
1 Indochina; Dependency and Destitution .
As with the political and military arenas, any
discussion of the economies of Indochina must be prefaced
by recognizing the fact that Vietnam and the leadership in
Hanoi dominate and control the economies of both Laos and
Kampuchea. Vietnamese "advisors" are in phvsical
attendance in the respective seats of power in both cf these
countries and clearly exert great influence on the daily
and long-range policies of the (nominal) governments of Laos
and Kampuchea. Therefore, for the purposes of this
discussion, all references to Indochina will be inclusive,
in acknowledgement of Vietnamese authority and government.
A major contributing factor to the present plight of
Indochina has been the almost constant warfare that has been
prosecuted within Indochinese territorv for the last 40
years. For Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea this has meant
not only having to cope with wartime destruction, but also
having to depend on external powers for massive levels of
financial assistance. The economies of Indochina are
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heavily dependent en foreign economic aid. Bevond the tact
that such dependence most certainly incurs political
obligations as well as increases the national debt, such an
arrangement has a debilitating effect on any country's sense
of independence. Since 1978, Indochina has had to rely
almost exclusively on the Soviet Union bloc for annual
subsidies. Soviet aid to Vietnam alone since 1975 is
estimated to total between $4 and $6 billion, and this
support is continuing. CPike, 1982/33:233 The result has
been tnat the three Indochinese states have developed highly
artificial economies with questionable indicators of real
development. With this in mind, statistical indicators
(when thev 3ir<s rarely made available) must be examined with
caution, and cited with caveats to their reliability and
validity. It is in this atmosphere of current uncertainty
that Vietnam plods along towards an equally uncertain
future.
The military victories of the national communist
parties of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea in 1975 and the
subsequent Vietnamese dominance of Indochina by 1973 brought
a central government into power which was ill prepared to
remedy the economic problems of a post—war federation of
three states. The same Hanoi leadership that achieved such
impressive victories in war simply has not demonstrated the
talent needed to win the peace. Many of the problems of
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post-war Indochina can be attributed, to the inability o-f
the central government to deal with the complexities of
peacetime administration. The economic sector has been one
o-f the most visible examples o-F this -failing. Admissions to
this effect were made during the 1982 -fifth national partv
congress in Hanoi. Vietnamese Communist Partv Secretary-
General Le Buan




. . . di -f f icul ties have also stemmed -from shortcomings
and mistakes o-f the party and state agencies, from
national down to grass-roots levels, in economic
leadership and management and in the running of our
society. In certain fields, the shortcomings and
mistakes in leadership and management have been the
main causes leading to, or aggravating, the economic
and social difficulties in the past vears. " CThayer
,
(April) 1933:160:
Such open criticism directlv attacking past actions
of the ruling elite are unprecedented. This points out
that the "old guard" in Hanoi, often hiding behind
ideological dogma, brought Indochina to a virtual economic
standstill between 1977 and 1979. Hard-line communist
policies were dictated at this time by the power faction in
Hanoi that Douglas Pike calls the "ideol ogues. " CPi ke , (May)
1933:173 The Hanoi ideologues instituted wide-ranging
economic reforms throughout the "liberated" territories
starting in 1975. This program of reformation involved
at least two phases: "socialist transformation" designed to
destroy the remaining "feudal" and "capitalist" elements in
97

the captive societies: and "socialist construction" based
on centralized state control and planning. CSmi th , 1983:1205:
Neither of these strategies was very successful in
motivating productivity and, combined with Door growing
weather, -flooding, and an occasional typhoon. led to near
famine conditions throughout Indochina during 1977-78.
Economic and political oppression also accounted -for
the mass exodus of over a million people from Indochina
between 1975 and 1979, many of whom came from the "socialist
paradise" of Vietnam proper. The depressed state of
Indochina's economy and the fleeing populace both peaked at
opposite ends of the spectrum in 1978. Marginal
improvements in living conditions since then have somewhat
ameliorated the flow in recent years. Estimates of the
numbers of "boat people" in 1982 were somewhere near 65,000
people, declining from approximately 76,000 in 1980, and
75,000 in 1981. C Pike, 1983 Communist Yearbook: 2253
Ironically, Indochina has also benefited from the massive
refugee exodus by money sent to relatives still inside
Indochina from exiled refugees which accounts for the
largest source of hard-currency inside Vi etnam. Cibid. . : 224}
One of the more disasterous programs that Hanoi
instituted in an early effort to socialize Indochina's
economy was that of hasty collectivization. Hanoi created
what are now called New Economic Zones (NEZs) in an attempt
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to bring -food productivitv under -direct government central
and -Force the development of the vital agricultural
resources of south Vietnam. These are rural collectives
wherein whole families have been relocated from urban
centers and have been assigned jobs working in agriculture.
Self-sufficiency on these collectives is encouraged as the
State simply cuts government subsistence after about a six
month adjustment period. In practice, State taxes and the
costs o-f daily living make minimal existence in the NEZs a
problem. Without outside business interests, many of the
f^lEZ families are barily able to eke out a minimal standard
of 1 i ving. CQuinn-Judge, (June) 1933:253
Since 1979 and the near catastrochic failures of
socialist transformation, the Hanoi leadership have been
swayed by more moderate voices concerning economic matters.
Douglas Pike refers to this faction as the
"pragmatists. " CPi ke, (Summer) 19S3: 173 Under the
influence of the pragmatists, Hanoi embarked on several new
courses designed to liberalize economic policies and promote
vitally needed growth in the faltering structure. Among
the most important policies adopted in the agricultural
field has been promotion of the "contract system" of
cooperative land tenure. This is basicallv a
decentralization of the economy which allows contracted
families to sell all production that is beyond the state
production quota. This serves to provide incentive to the
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-farmer to work harder for state as well as personal pro-fit.
Additional new policies aimed at boosting industrial output
include piecework rates -for laborers, bonuses, and increased
managerial autonomy. CThayer , (11-14 April) 1983:1533
State attempts to regulate all aspects o-f the
economy have also encouraged the development o-f a
significant counter—economy in Indochina in the -form o-f
"black market" operations. An indicator o-f the strength o-f
the black market in Vietnam is that 50 percent of wholesale
and 60 percent o-f retail trade is reportedly controlled by
private (non-government) traders. CChanda, (6 October ): 48j
The situation is perceived to be such a serious threat to
the socialist economy that Hanoi has on occasion come out
with public castigaticns indicating that participants in
the black market are:
"...depriving the state of its ability to control
goods, money. markets and prices; creating many
difficulties in production and livelihood: and





Nevertheless, the growing underground market economy
continues to thrive and make inroads on even the most
socialized areas of ore-war Indochina. As put by Jacques de




"One thing is certain: Recourse to a market economy
is more significant above the 17th parallel than
advances in socialized agriculture below
it. "CBarrin, (April) 1933:313
Indochina
-finds itself torn today between trvina to
preserve the validity of an orthodox non-market socialist
system while sustaining pressure to improve its economy
pragmatically through proven capitalist mechanisms. The
internal friction between the ideologues and the pragmatists
in Hanoi is substantial as a result of this division. The
question is, will the communist leadership be able to
withstand the current tri al -by-fire, maintain their hold on
the country, and still bring Indochina into the modern
economic world? Only time will tell.
2. ASEAN: Growth and Stablity .
The economies of the ASEAN states have developed
in significantly different directions. Almost all of these
nations have emerged from an orderly and lawful transition
of power between colonial and nationalist governments. The
two exceptions to this ^re Thailand and Indonesia. Though
the Thai economy was clearly dominated by the West during
the colonial period, Thailand was never a metropolitan
colony. Indonesia was a colonized territory, coming into
existence not through lawful transition but under




The -fundamental difference-- between the economic
development of Indonesia and Indochina was the ideological
methodology. Communism and Nationalism were concepts that
were never wedded in Indonesia as they were in Indochina.
On the contrary, Indonesia's periodic flirtations with
communism and the social disasters that accompanied these
experiences have strengthened that country's aversion to
communist methods and to the people that expouse them.
In some respects, an aversion to communism has been
as much a part of the evolution of all ASEAN economies, as
has the processes of nationalism themselves. All of these
countries have historical reason to fear communism in any
form.
Addi ti onal 1 v, participation in some form of market
economy has always been a natural method of doing business
in Southeast Asia. While much of ASEAN 's structural
foundation can be attributed to western colonial influence,
the philosophy o-f a free—trading/market economv is one of
long-standing precedence in Southeast Asia.
Since its inception in 1975, ASEAN has formed the
backbone of progressive trade in Southeast Asia. In 1973,
the same year of Indochina's greatest desperation, ASEAN '
s
total Gross National Product (GNP) was over 116,000 dollars
(U.S.), with per capita GNP averaging about 4S0 dollars.
Currently, ASEAN ranks high among the Less Developed
Countries (LDC) in terms of real average economic growth.
io:

ASEAN 's political and economic development has
borrowed from western standards and has improved on them.
In an e-ffort to reduce regional strife and increase
economic growth, ASEAN has established a record o-f progress
unparalled in the recent historv o-f the world. ASEAN ' s
performance as an organization surpasses even that o-f the
European Economic Common Market in terms o-f real growth over
a comparable period o-f development. Since the -founding, the
ASEAN states have collectively achieved between 6 and 11
percent average annual growth in SNP and are the only group
o-f nations on the globe in which real GNP is doubling everv
seven to twelve years. CPike, (Summer) 1983:201 As these
figures imply, ASEAN 's collective operations dominate the
economies o-f Southeast Asia, including those o-f Indochina.
B. COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES.
Regional contrasts between ASEAN and Indochina are
apparent in many aspects o-f the two regional economies.
Contrasts also exist between the regional economies and
those o-f the individual members o-f each system. Given the
degree o-f such diversity, it is remarkable that cooperative
behavior can be achieved at all in Southeast Asia. The
-following discussion explores these contrasts.
1
. Demographic and Geographic Indices .
An examination o-f the geography o-f Southeast Asia
shows that the diversity o-f land areas throughout the region
io;

creates special problems unique" to each of the local
governments. Land masses range -from island archipelagos to
mainland peninsulas and -from sea level sand soitB to
towering mountain chains. Indonesia has the largest land
area but is divided into over 14,000 islands, making
adequate government a logistics nightmare. Singapore
occupies the smallest land area^ but has the largest
population density o-f the region. The second smallest
nation, Brunei, has the tiniest population but is the
wealthiest o-f the lot.
The combined states o-f Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea
occupy over 50 percent of peninsular Southeast Asia (not
counting Burma), yet they account for the smallest total
population in the region. ASEAN countries have a total
population of over a quarter of a billion (approximate! v 270
million), as opposed to Indochina's approximate 67
million. This statistic is esoeciallv ironic considering
that the major threat of expansion in recent years has been
from Indochina.
Table IV-I is a comparative listing of major




BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC AND GEOGRAPHIC INDICATORS
Population Adult Li-fe
Growth Lite- Exp-
Total Density 1975-80 racy ect-
Area (millions) (persons/ (7. per (7.) ancy
Country (sq. kms) mid-1982 sq. km) annum) 1980 1981
INDOCHINA
Vi etnam 332,568 UO. O 170. 19 2.30 87 63
Laos 236 , 798 3.7 15.25 2.39 44 43
Kampuchea 181,035 6.5 35.91 1.01 — 37
ASEAN
Thai 1 and 513,998 49.8 96.89 2.34 86 63
Mai aysi a 378 , 508 14.7 38.84 £.m JO 60 65
Si ngapore 585 4,273.50 1.21 83 7n
Indonesia 1,904,333 151.3 7.95 1.70 62 54
Philippines 299,681 51.6 172.18 2.67 75 63
Brunei 5.765 0.2 34.69 2.40 45 66
SOURCES: Far area, Hammond World Atlas , 1980; population
totals. Far Eastern Economic Review 1983 Yearbook ; density
o-f populations was computed -from area and total columns;
growth o-f populations is -from The Far East and Australasia
1982-83 , :29; literacy and life expectancy data is from The
World Bank, World Development Report 1983.
While the density o-f population column re+lected in
TABLE IV-I gives a general picture o-f the land area
available to Southeast Asians, it does not show the true
distribution o-f the population todav. Urbanization has hit
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most of the economies o-f the region as jobs. social
upheaval, and the prospects of a higher standard of living
make movement to the city an increasingly attractive
proposition. Added to the demographic impact o-f this
migration in Southeast Asia is the -fact that urbanization
means movement is usually
-focused on one major city in each
country; typically the capital. In most cases, there-fore,
urbanization statistics are a good indicator of the
percentage o-f a nation's total population that resides in
the capital city.
Most o-f these growing metropolitan seats o-f
government are unable to handle their expanding burdens.
An example o-f this is Thailand's capital city o-f Bangkok.
Bangkok presently supports a population o-f well over 6
million. This is an increase o-f over 5 million people since
the late 1960s, most o-f which are currently occupying
the same space as 1 million did 20 years ago. Many o-f these
people are unemployed and without adequate housing, as jobs
are insu-f -f icient and housing space limited.
Over population in all o-f the capitals o-f region has
led to a wide variety o-f social problems. Alain Cass,
reporting on Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh Citv, indicates that:
"At night hundreds o-f pavement-dwellers, people with
no houses, sleep in rat infested streets
reminiscent o-f Calcutta. Everything is scarce:
-food, drugs, petrol, spare parts, jobs. There are




-full o-f younQ- peoole cyclina to and
-fro. "CCass, 1982:193
The lack of adequate housing has caused what Donald
Fryer calls the "squatter" phenomenon. A large percentage
o-f recent arrivals to the cities are landless "squatters"
that are jammed together in slum areas with densities that
sometimes reach as high as 5,000 persons per hectare. [Fryer
,
1979; 93 j These slums are o-f ten lacking adequate light,
water, or sanitation services, and generally are considered
to be a serious menace to society. Crime and disease both
breed in these environs, as adequate government is difficult
to establish in these areas.
Apart from Singapore which is 100 percent urbanized
already and has been able to solve many of its urban
problems, Southeast Asia's urbanisation in 1931 ran from 14
percent of the total population in Laos (up from 3 percent
in 1960) to 37 percent in the Philippines (uo from 30
percent in the same period). Vietnam was estimated to have
19 percent of its people living in the urban sector in 1931
(up from 15 percent in 1960); Thailand with 15 percent (up
from 13 percent); Indonesia with 21 percent (up from 15
percent); and Malaysia with 35 percent (up from 30 percent
in 1960) . CThe World Bank, 1983:190-191:
2. Energy Production and Consumption .
In terms of standards of living, Singapore's
advanced state of controlled urbanization shows a
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correspondingly high level of energy consumption and income
per capita while the rest of the region, with the exception
o-f Brunei, lags -Far behind. Though complete data is
lacking on Brunei, it is a significant net exporter of oil
and has a per capita income which surpasses even
Singapore ' s.
In many of the rest of the countries of the region,
however. the rural population and the urban ooor have
limited access to energy resources including electric
power and are denied many of the conveniences of modern
civilization. This circumstance is especially true of the
poorly developed Indochinese states who, for example, must
import 100 percent of their energy petroleum needs from the
Soviet Union and allied communist bloc nations. This
totalled more than 1.65 million tons of petroleum products
in 19S2, 24,000 tons over the amount imported in 1981. Even
at this rate, Hanoi reported that the fuel available was 20
percent below their minimum needs. CQuinn-Judge, (2 February)
1984:473 The limited supplies and the need to conserve
fuel is reflected in the fact that Vietnamese factories
often operate at less than 50 percent capacity and almost
all individual transportation is done by bicvcle.
Laos and Kampuchea, in turn, receive their
allotments of petroleum through Hanoi. This, in all




-hepes to become self-
sufficient in oil by 1985 based on deposits off southern
Vietnam in the South China Sea have not yet been realized.
Though an American oil company reported a flow o-f 2,400
barrels a day -from an off-shore site south of Ho Chi Minh
(Saigon) city just before the end of the 1975 war, joint
Soviet-Vietnamese efforts to exploit this potential have so
far been unsuccessful. This may be changing, however, as
Vietnam has at last announced a Soviet oil strike of
unspecified value on its southern continental shel f . CQuinn-
Judge, (June) 19S4: 101 Though potentially very important
for the future develooment of Indochina, it remains to be
seen whether Moscow and Hanoi can effectivelv exploit the
new found resource.
ASEAN countries are not so limited in the sources or
quantity of their energy supplies. Malaysia, Brunei and
Indonesia are all net exporters of oil and liquid natural
gas (LNG) , and Indonesia is rapidly becoming the world's
largest exporter of LNG.
Malaysia produced more than 300,000 barrels of oil
per day (b/d) in 1982. Estimated oil reserves are around
2,500 million barrel s. LFisher , "Malaysia" 1983:732:
Malaysia also has natural gas deposits from which thev are
currently producing more than 1.7 million metric tons for
export. CFEER, 1983 Yearbook: 1993
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Brunei produced more than .1.75,000 b/d in 1983. Its
estimated reserves are more than 1.6 million
barrels. CWeatherbee, (June) 1983:7253 At the current rate
o-f production, this should give them at least a 20 ves.r
reserve. Brunei is also the -fourth largest supplier of LNG
in the world. Exports in 1932 totalled more than 12.6
million cubic meters o-f liquified gas. CKul karni , 1934: 3i
3
Indonesia produced more than 584 million barrels of
oil in 1981. They were estimated to have more than 16.000
million barrels of recoverable reserves of oil, and more
than 34,700,000 million cubic feet of gas reserves in
1983. [Buchanan. 1983:5223 In addition, new fuel
discoveries are being made almost daily. At the current
rate of production, the known reserves should give Indonesia
about 26 years of oil, and about 50 years of natural
gas. Cibid.
, :5223
Thailand is also involved in developing its natural
gas resources in the Gulf of Thailand, reserves of which are
estimated at 320,000 million cubic meters. Production in
1982 neared 6 million cubic meters per dav. [Fisher,
"Thailand" 1983:1125 3
Profitable development of natural gas resources may
offset the increasing energv import problems that -facie both
Thailand and Indonesia. While in the rest of ASEAN energy
production exceeded energv consumption between 1974 and
1980, Thailand and Indonesia have been slipping behind.
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This is especially critical in Thailand's case, where energv
imports are Rearing 50 percent of its total merchandise
imports. Under these conditions, Bruce Glassburner has
suggested in his paper on economic prosDects -for Southeast
Asia that Thailand. Indonesia and the Philippines may be
•facing severe balance o-f payments pressures in the -future
brought about by the rising cost o-f energy, specifically
oil . [Glassburner , 1932:363
Concerning hydoelectric power, Laos is the only
one of the Indochinese states that has sel f -suf f ici encv in
electric power. Laos is in fact a net exporter of
electricity to Thailand which accounts for its principle
foreign-exchange earnings. Laos sold approximately £44
million worth of electricity to Thailand in
1983. CSricharatchanya, 1983:843 Since this is the major
export earner for Laos and supply is limited, it is probable
that the local population sees very little of either the
electricity or of the profits made from selling it. While
Indochina has several hvdroelectric projects underway to
remedy their energy deficits, none of these is expected to
improve the quality of life in Indochina much before the end
or the decade. CQuinn-Judge, (Mav) 1984:813
Table IV-II shows the current available statistical
















per capita as *'. of
(kgs.o-f coal Merchandise
equivalent) Exports
Country 196 1960 1 980 60 SO
INDOCHINA
Vietnam 0.0 6.6 11.3 -1.3 95 148 — —
Laos — 9.3 13.8 16.2 16 127 — —
Kampuchea — — -5. 1 44.0 19 123 9
ASEAN
Thai 1 and 28.3 16.3 6.5 63 370 12 44
Malaysi a 36.8 24. 1 4. 1 7.7 616 881 2 13
Si ngapore — — 10. 1 6.6 2,111 8,544 17 36
Indonesia 8. 5 5.9 4.3 9.0 129 266 3 a
Philippines 3.0 26.2 9.7 4.4 159 380 9 41
Note: Brunei is not included due to lack o-f available data.
SOURCE: The World Bank, World Development Report 19S3.
As an indicator o-f progress in the development o-f
electricity on a regional level, Thailand. Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Vietnam all reported increases in
hvdroel ectrici tv output o-f over 50 percent between 1973 and
1981. CU.N., 1983:75] Thus, while accounting -for in-flation,
one could assume -from the rapidlv increasina per capita
11:

consumption of energy across-the-board in Southeast Asia
that prosperity levels are rising in all o-f the countries o-f
i
the region.
3. Income, Growth and National Debt .
Excluding Kampuchea's Der capita GNP and average
income levels (which ars unknown but would probably e-f-fect
little change on overall Indochinese totals), Indochina's
per capita income level and aggregate GNP ^re a little over
3 oercent o-f ASEAN levels. While per capita income varies
considerably between ASEAN members, the highest individual
Indochinese GNP, Vietnam's, is only marginally above that
of the lowest ASEAN member, Brunei. This comparison is
deceptive, however, as Brunei also has the highest per
capita income o-f any nation in Southeast Asia.
In terms o-f income, Indochina ranks among the
poorest countries in the world. Kampuchea is rated bv the
World Bank as being "the" poorest. Inflation in Vietnam is
running anywhere -from 100 to 200 percent per year, and
although -figures ars not available -for the rest o-f
Indochina, it can be assumed that their inflation situation
parallels Vietnam's. This is conservati vel v more than
double the comparable aggregate ASEAN rate of inflation.
Vietnam's national debt, both in hard currency and
other aid, ranges from $4 to $6 billion with the Soviet
Union while hard currency debts to non-communist countries
stands at about $1.3 bi 1 1 ion. CPi ke, 1932/83:233 Debt
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payments to non-communist countries in 1982 has been
estimated at close to *238 mi 1 1 ion. CMcWi 1 1 i ams, 1983:65] A
combination o-f rescheduling, re-financing, and postponements
has reduced payments by nearly $21 million -from 1981
obligations, but this is still not enough. Vietnam's debt
repayment schedule is over 200 percent of their total annual
hard currency export earnings and remains bevond their
ability to pay.Cibid, :65.] Concerning Vietnam's
outstanding debts to the Soviet Union and CEMA (Council -for
Mutual Economic Assistance) Hanoi has even less ability to
make good on these obligations. Since at least 1981,
however, Vietnam has been export ing human labor to help
o-f-fset their growing -financial tab. Current estimates o-f
what some have called "Vietnamese slave labor" presently
working in CEMA countries ranges anywhere -from 100,000 to
500,000 people.
[
Indochina Chronology , (April-June) 1983:63
Reportedly, a percentage o-f the "salaries" o-f these laborers
is credited towards paying o-f-f Vietnam's national debts.
Additionally, a small portion o-f their debt is compensated
-for bv allowing the Soviet's the use o-f port -facilities en
Vietnamese soil.
Laos has non—communist -foreign debts standing at
greater than $250 million (1980 -figure). Laos' real GDP in
1930 was only *300 mi 1 1 i on. CBur 1 ev , 1983:708: Although
Laos' total hard-currencv debt to the Soviet Union is
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unknown (Laos' last reported total- foreign debt in 1973 was
$81.16 million), the rate o-f accumulation was retarded by
1981. Moscow ended commodity assistance to Laos and
instituted aid in the -form o-f annually renegotiated trading
arrangements in non-convertible currencies. Vietnam also
subscribes to this arrangement but claims that its services
to Laos between 1976 to 1985 are worth $146.7 mi 1 1 ion. CQuinn-
Judge, (October) 1983:503
Kampuchea is in debt to Vietnam to the tune of at
least $50 million and owes the Soviet Union at least $315
million (based on totals to 1980). Non-communist aid to
Kampuchea (most of which does not have to be repaid) since
1979 totals close to $L billion. [Richardson. (5 February)
1982:22-233
Among the ASEAN countries. statistics for 1981
showed Thailand running a foreign debt of $5,169 million;
the Philippines, $7,338 million; Malaysia, $4,627 million;
Indonesia
, $15,529 million; and Singapore with $1,318
million. EWorld Bank, 1983:178-179:
Table IV—III shows some currently available income
and growth indicators tor Southeast Asia.

TABLE IV- I II—





Dol lars Ave Annual In-fl-
Bank Income 1981 Growth at i on
Country Rankinq per capita (bi 1 1 i on 1970-81 (CPI)
1983 (U.S.*) U.S. *) (7.) 1931
INDOCHINA
Vietnam 20 160 4.9 2.4 200
Laos 3 90 . 3 2.0 n. a.
Kampuchea 1 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a.
ASEAN
Thai 1 and 48 815 39.29 18.08 12.7
Malaysia 77 1,797 25.71 1 1 . 20 9.6
Singapore 93 4,071 12.39 1 4 . 80 8.2
Indonesi a 41 520 84.00 7.50 7. 1
Philippines 49 815 1 . 90 6 . 00 12.4
Brunei — 22 , 000 .46 9. 1
SOURCES: For Brunei income, Far Easterr i Economic Review, 15
March 1984
,
p. 58: Brunei , V i etnam 2< Laos GNP, C J. m i~i a *
The World Factbook -1982: Brunei in-fl ation. Far Eastern
Economic Review 1983 Yearbook: for Laos growth rate, Defense




Dcuqlas Pi ke. Pacifi c De-fence Revi ew •for the
rest
, The World Bank , World Development Report 1983.
4. Structure of Production .
While statistical data is often not available from




-Facts that are known paint a -fairly good
picture o-f the general direction o-f their economic
activities.
All o-f the Indochinese countries are heavily
involved in agricultural trade. Since 1979, the major
emphasis o-f all three nations has been to reduce ideological
constraints on management, and stimulate growth in the
agricultural sector. In 1981, Vietnam reported that 38.4
percent of its GDP was committed to agriculture. This is
probably a -fair representation o-f the general direction o-f
production -for Laos and Kampuchea also.
Apart -from rice, additional significant agricultural
industry -for Vietnam includes: natural rubber, tea, co-f-fee,
spices, palm oil, -foodstuffs, other farm products, and fish.
Fishing accounts for a significant share of Vietnam's exDort
credits. While the total sea catch in 1983 totalled more
than 511,000 tons (up 15 percent over 1982), a good
proportion of this is sold to non-communist countries. In
1932, Vietnam earned more than $50 million from its shrimD
sales.
Agricultural products o-f Laos include: rice, timber,
wcod products, coffee, and undeclared products of oDium and
tobacco; for Kampuchea: rice, natural rubber, jute, pepper,
and wood products. Due to the social and political
disruption over the last 30 years, neither of these
countries has been very successful in maintaining a
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consistent level of agricultural production. Reliable
growth statistics, if any were to become available, would
probably be quite low.
In the industrial sector, the second largest area of
the GDP, Vietnam has experienced relatively low rates of
growth due to problems o-f administrative incompetence, poor
labor incentives, halting reconstruction of wartime damage.
and the lack o-f energy resources to run -factories at
productive levels.
Vietnam does have a -fairly well established coal
industry. Proven coal reserves in Vietnam total
approximately 130 million tons, su-f-ficient to last another
20 years at current production levels, Although Hanoi has
had problems in recent years meeting production targets,
administrative changes may improve past oer-f ormance.
Exported coal is one of Vietnam's largest convertible-
currency earning product, accounting for more than $40
million in 1982. CDuinn-Judge , (February) 1984:473
Vietnam has deposits of other minerals such as tin,
tungsten, zinc, iron, antimony, chromium, apatite, and
bauxite. None of these resources is being significantly
exploited at this time.
Nguyen Van Canh in his book on Vietnam Under
Communi sm
,
points out that in the manufacturing sector, the
industrial north is still in the process of recovering from
US

the damage it sustained during the U. S. -Vietnamese war, and
that onlv small supplies of minor items such as "...cotton
cloth, soap and bicycles are now being produced in quantity
that attempts to meet the people's needs. "[Van Kanh,
1983:271
Laos and Kampuchea are -faced with many o-f these same
problems in their industrial and manufacturing sectors, but
have even less ability to cope with them. Laos' major
industrial product is tin. Proven reserves have been
documented at 65,000 tons, but actual reserves may run as
high as 700,000 tons. Other mineral deposits such as iron
ore, lead, zinc, coal, sylvite, and potash ^re present in
Laos but as yet &r<5 undeveloped. Manufacturing in Laos and
Kampuchea is insignificant and, in the case of Laos,
accounts for less than 5 percent of the GDP.CBurley,
1983:7071
Besides Vietnam, only Laos has a viable stake in the
service sector of the GDP. Though statistics Are again
unavailable, Laos has significant exports of electric power.
Hydroelectric power production from the Laotian Nam Ngum Dam
totals more than 600 million kilowatt hours per year. As
indicated previously, over 90 percent of this power is
exported to non—communi st nations for convertible-
currency . Cibid. , :7071
Vietnam's service sector is accounted for under its
so-called aid programs to the rest of Indochina. According
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to Hanoi, Vietnam sends more than 900 "specialists" to Laos
annually and assists in more than 100 civilian developmental
programs including war reconstruction, building highways,
assisting transportation, and general administration. Aid
provided to Laos -from 1976 to 1985 is reported at more than
$146 million. While no breakout of specific tasks has been
reported for Vietnamese assistence to Kampuchea, similar
projects can be assumed. Kampuchean officials have
reported a total of £113 million in aid from Hanoi (much of
which will not be repaid) between 1979 and 1980. CQui nn-
Judge, (October) 1933:501
ASEAN countries &r<= also heavily involved in
agriculture, but with the aid of technologv are
increasingly trying to shift their base of production
towards more industrialization and manufacturing.
Thailand's traditionally agricultural economy is a
typical example of this progression towards increased
industrialization. Up until 1930, agriculture dominated the
Thai economy with rice as the primary cultivated crop. In
1981, Thailand's GDP share of industrial production overtook
that of agriculture by almost 4 percent. Neverthel ess , the
rice harvest in that same year reached a record high of 3.06
million metric tons.CDixon, 1983:11313 While the
percentage of industrial growth between 1970 and 1981 showed
almost twice the comparable agricultural levels, harvest
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performance does not seem to have been adversely a-f-fected.
Thailand remains a signi-ficant net exporter o-f rics with
this commodity accounting for over 17.2 percent o-f total
exports in 1981. Cibid. , s 1 1313 Other important agricultural
products include cassava, jute, corn, sugar, rubber, fish,
and wood products.
Thailand's industrial sector is mostly involved with
the processing of primary produce in small-scale plants.
Improving methods of standardization, and management
practices should act to consolidate individual efforts over
a period of time and contribute towards increased
industrialization in the future.
Manufacturing has also expanded in recent years and
is competing with agriculture for proportionate shares of
the GDP. Textiles are the greatest contributer to this
growth market, accounting for 22.1 percent of 19S1
exports. Cibid. , : 11343
Services, mostly in the form of tourism and
entertainment, remain a strong sector of the economv
accounting for the highest share of the Thai GDP in 1981.
Energy is a major source of concern for Thailand's
economy as Bangkok currently imports over SO percent of the
nation's needs. To remedy Thailand's energy problems,
Bangkok is attempting to exploit large natural gas deposits
located off-shore in the Gulf of Thailand. Production in
19S2 was estimated at 200 million cubic feet oer day. While
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the majority of this gas will eventually be reserved -for
export, Thailand plans to convert local electricity
generating plants -from oil to gas, making a sizeable dent
in their current dependence on external sources tor this
resource. [ibid. , :1135D
Malaysia has achieved a -fairly high level of
industrialization in recent years. This has been largely
the result o-f exploitation o-f their tremendous hydrocarbon
wealth. Manufacturing has also been expanding, however, and
accounts -for the largest percentage growth o-f the GDP in the
last decade. Prior to the development o-f Malaysia's oil and
gas industry, the agricultural sector dominated the GDP.
The production o-f natural rubber and palm oil still accounts
-for nearly a quarter of the present GDP share. Malavsia
remains the world's largest exporter of both of these
commodities. CKrause, 1932:203
Singapore has achieved almost total
industrialization. It has become the largest single
entrepot and service center in Southeast Asia. In this
respect, all of the other countries rely on its industrial
capacity to serve their economic interests. Singapore has
become the great middle—man in the area.
The largest single source of Singapore's income is
that of services. In recent years these services have
+ocused more on high yield endeavors such as finance.
i ?7

insurance, and real estate, while— moving away -from less
profitable enterprises such as retail and wholesale trade.
Manufacturing has also been on the rise, accounting tor
about one third of the total GDP in 19S1, Manufacturing in
Singapore appears to be retreating from traditional labor-
intensive products, and advancing towards skill-intensive
i ndustries. Cibid. , : 193
Indonesia has traditionally been the most
economically suppressed country in ASEAN and has had the
Furthest distance to travel in its attempts to modernize.
Since it has begun to reap the profits of its substantial
oil and gas deposits, industry has become the largest sector
of its GDP. Manufacturing has also shown significant
development in recent years accounting for the highest
percentage of growth in the economy.
The Philippines has recently moved into third
place (it was second in 1979) in ASEAN concerning
industrial share of the GDP. In 1982, it was second only
to Singapore in industrial development. The Philippines
still holds a substantial position in the manufacturing
sector with more than 25 percent of the total GDP accounted
for. Agriculture has fallen in recent vears and now totals
less than 23 percent of GDP. According to Lawrence Krause,
construction has been the fastest growing sector in the
Philippine economy . [Krause, 1982:203
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Table IV-IV shows the available regional statistic
concerning the structure o-f production.
TABLE IV-IV
STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION, 1981
Industry by percentage
Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services
Share Est. Share Est. Share Est. Share Est.
o-f Growth of Growth of Growth of Growth
GDP 1970- GDP 1970- GDP 1970- GDP 1970-








Thai . 24 4.5 28 9.9 20 10.3 48 7.5
Mala. 23 5.2 36 9.3 18 11. 1 41 8.5
Sing. 1 1.7 41 9.0 30 9.7 53 8. 5
Indo. 24 3.8 42 11.2 12 13.9 34 9.5
Phil. 23 4.9 37 3.4 6.9 40 5.3
Note: The sole product of Brunei is petroleum, no other
industry is of anv consequence.
SOURCES: The World Bank, World Develooment Reoort 1933.
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5. The Food Dimension .
. ._..
Increased -food production remains the primary
objective o-f the government (s) of Indochina.
Consistent short-falls in agricultural production have
plagued the communists since their take—over in 1975.
For a variety o-f reasons, annual -food production in
Vietnam has been at least 15 to 20 percent below the
country's basic needs during the last decade. Though Hanoi
claims that Vietnam became sel -f-su-f -f icient in -food bv 1982,
imports o-f nearlv 200,000 tons o-f grain were reported by the
International Monetary Fund -for that vear . [Quinn-Judqe,
(February) 1984:463 Reported grain production in -1983
neared 17 million tons, up -from 16 million tons in 1982, and
15 million tons in 1981. Nevertheless, rice allotments per
individual in 1983 were estimated at less than 5 kilos per
month. With other nutritional input, -food availability
was estimated at less than 2,000 calories per day per
person, less than minimum nutritional needs. CPi ke,
1982/33:224:
Additionally, though many forecasters in the West
have pointed to improved grain harvests in recent years as
evidence of Vietnam's salvation, Nayan Chanda indicates a
basic fallacy with this thinking. Chanda postulates that
even if Vietnam reaches its food production targets in
coming years and becomes a net exporter of food, Hanoi still
would not be meeting the basic nutritional needs of the

people, nor even achieving the level of nutrition o-f pre—war
years. He indicates that Vietnam has been exporting high-
grade rice -for some time, selling it for profit and then
importing a larger quantity of "broken rice" for its cwn
consumption. Chanda feels that self-sufficiency at this
time would simply mean a reduction of low grade rice
imports, and only a "marginal improvement" in the general
Vietnamese di et . [Chanda, 1934:293
In addition to Vietnam's present food dilema is the
fact that future populations will be even more demanding.
The population of Vietnam is expanding at an annual rate of
nearly 15 percent, rendering an additional 1.5 million
mouths to feed each year.CPike, 1982/33:2243
Laos has also claimed self-sufficiency in food since
at least 1930. In fact, though rice production in the last
three years has been reported at over 1 million tons,
Vientiane still imports more than 30,000 tons of rice
annually from Thai 1 and. CChanda, (August) 1933:333
Kampuchea still faces the spectre of starvation.
Predictions of food production in 1933 indicated at least a
100,000 ton deficit. Annual massive food aid is still
necessary to avert widespread death due to starvation. As
it is, malnutrition and disease are rampant in this country.
A recent U.N. study concluded that as much as 60 percent of
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rural Kampuchean children ar~e suffering -from
malnutrition. [Becker, 1984:473
Food shortages in the ASEAN countries is also a
matter o-f some concern. Though not a crucial matter at this
time, the ASEAN countries -fear that escalating population
growth will result in -food demand outpacing production.
Though not reflected in the available statistics,
Indonesia and the Philippines have both had problems in this
regard. According to a United Nations report in 19S2,
neither country was producing or importing sufficient -food
to. meet the caloric reguirements o-f their popul ations. CFacts
On File, 1932:1613 It has been suggested that should this
situation continue beyond social upheavals, these nations
run the risk o-f a -foreign exchange crisis that would in turn
inhibit local economic growth.
With the exception o-f Thailand, all o-f the ASEAN
states arB net importers o-f food. Indonesia is the largest
importer of rice in the world having bought nearly one-
third of the rice available on the international market in
recent years. CGI assburner , 1932:413 Thailand, on the other
hand, is one of the world's largest suppliers of rice, much
of which i5 shipped to other ASEAN members.
Though apparently not a concern at the moment, the
possibility of a food crisis must always be a consideration
of ASEAN governments. Future population explosions and/or
the inability of ASEAN countries to produce or import

necessary staples could threaten the tenure o-f this group o-f
nations at almost any time. A -food crisis, more than any
political threat, could be the greatest single danger to the
-Future peace and stability of Southeast Asia.
Table IV—V shows key agricultural, food production,
and nutritional statistics for Southeast Asia to 1980.
I
TABLE IV-V
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Thai 1 and 121




107 1,977 90 — 71
103 1
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329 97 83 75





2,308 104 84 76
2,625 121 63 50
3,153 134 8 2
2,315 110 75 55
2.275 116 61 46
SOURCES: For personal production data, Europa, The Far East
and Australasia 1932-33, :36; the rest from The World Bank.




Indochina's trade patterns have undergone considerable
change over the last 30 years. Many o-f the early avenues of
trade were determined by colonial ties and wartime
necessity. France and Japan were among the main trading
partners tor this area prior to 1954. As these ties were
severed during the late 50s and earlv 60s, new trading
partners in the -form of the United States, China, and the
Soviet Union began to emerge. This was relatively short-
lived, however, as the communist seizure of power in
Indochina began to narrow the field to the two communist
giants and a few non-threatening capitalist states.
Bv 1976, Vietnam relied on the Soviet Union for more
than a third of
.
its imports. Japan was also an important
source of Vietnamese imports, accounting for almost a
quarter of the total incoming commodities. Principle
export partners for Vietnam at this time included: the
Soviet Union (37 percent), Japan (21 percent). Singapore (11
percent), and Hong Kong (10 percent). After the 197S
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, access to western markets
was temporarily restricted, mostly due to U.S. and ASEAN
political pressures. This resulted in the Soviet Union
assuming almost 60 percent of Vietnam's exports and 66
percent of their imports in 1978- CSmith, 1983:12123
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While keeping Vietnam barely afl.oat , increased reliance
on non-convertible currency trade with the Soviet Union
deprived Vietnam of vital cash and acted to drive them
-further into debt (with their victory in 1975, Hanoi
inherited a $570 million trade de-Ficit). Without
convertible funds, Vietnam had no way to pay o-f-f its already
excessive trade deficits with the West while debts to the
Soviets continued to mount. By 1979, Vietnam's trade
de-ficit amounted to more than $778 million with exports at




Hanoi realized that something had to be done about their
crowing inability to pay their debts, both to communist and
non-communist trading partners. There-fore, by 1979 they
launched a concerted effort to increase their trade with
capitalist nations and reduce their dependence on trade
with socialist countries. However, this has been only
partially successful in solving their problems.
Though technically still under international sanction
for its continuing occupation of Kampuchea, Vietnam
reestablished many of its pre-1973 contacts with western
markets during the early 80s. In many cases, this has been
done through middleman re—exporters in Singapore and
Hong Kong. In fact, Hanoi's current major non-communist
trading partners are Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, with




1983:82-333 Among the other Asian countries who deal with
Vietnam through Singapore and Hong Kong are China, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Austral i a, CRees, 1984:56-573 Western
European trade with Vietnam, usually conducted through
either Singapore or Hong Kong, has included West Germany,
France, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Great Britain, and
Ireland. CChanda, (November) 1979:483 The United States
also conducts trade with Vietnam through third-party
sources.
Significant Vietnamese exports to Japan include sea-food
(totalling $50 million in 1982), and coal. Of 300,000 tons
o-f coal exported in 1982, 700,000 tons went to the West,
primarily Japan. Since 1982, however. South Korea has been
taking an increasing share o-f Vietnam's coal. This
arrangement has helped to o-f-fset Japan's reduced demand due
to technical innovations. CQuinn-Judge, February 1984:473
Vietnamese imports through Hong Kong accounted -for
nearly one quarter o-f their total imports from non—communist
sources in 1982. This was nearly $54 million worth o-f
everything from chemicals to machinery. China and Taiwan
supplied organic and inorganic chemicals. petroleum and
petroleum products, and food products while the United
States and Japan supplied industrial machinery and
automobiles. The U.S. was a prime supplier of oower
generating equipment, while Japan accounted for more than SO
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percent of all the vehicles that were, re-exported to Vietnam
through Hong Kong in 1982. CLauriat , 1983:82-83:
Vietnamese imports -from Singapore amounted to more than
$SS million in 19S3, while exports to Singapore reached $29
million. CRees, 1934:56:
Current Vietnamese trade with the Soviet Union and other
communist countries reportedly accounts tor av^r 75 percent
of their total exports. Vietnam exports handicrafts, light-
industrial goods, agricultural products, seafood, and manual
laborers to the socialist bloc. Imports include petroleum,
cement, grain, and military armament . CChanda, October
1933:66-67:
Vietnam's total exports in 1982 reached $592 million.
This was an increase over 1981 by 27 percent, but still not
enough to service its outstanding debts. Vietnam's payments
to non-communist parties in 1932 were approximately $247
million, 152 percent o-f its hard-currency earnings. Cibi d. :
Laos and Kampuchea have never had extensive trade ties
with extra-regi onal nations. International trade tor both
of these countries has generally been dependent, at any
particular point in time, to the relative status of their
relationship with either Thailand or Vietnam. The direction
of external trade for Laos and Kampuchea often depends on




Until 1975. both Laos and Kampuchea were dealing
extensively with China, the United States, and Thailand.
Since 1978, extra-regional trade has been more con-fined to
dealings with the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Current
limited economic relations with non-communist nations have
very little to do with trade, and are more typically
con-fined to the receipt o-f aid.
The record o-f ASEAN ' s participation in international
trade is one that is much more complete and successful.
ASEAN provides the world with 91 percent o-f its unprocessed
rubber, 37 percent of its tin, 38 percent of its palm oil,
73 percent of its copra, 62 percent of its tropical
hardwood, and most of its spices, plus some copper, abaca,
and cocoa, CKrause, 1932:23-241 Oil, petroleum products,
and natural gas Are Indonesia's main exports, while Malaysia
dominates in tin, palm oil, natural rubber and timber
exports. The Philippines exports timber, copra, and sugar
while Thailand is noted for its grain products of rice and
corn. Singapore is chiefly concerned with industrialization
of the raw commodities from the rest of Southeast Asia. It
is a major exporter of processed rubber and refined
petroleum products along with other manufactured
goods. CPauker, 1931:3-41
Exports of goods and nonf actor services accounted for 19
percent of the GDP of the Philippines in 1931 (the same as
in 1979) , 53 percent of Malaysia's (down from 53 percent in
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1979), 2S percent o-f Indonesia's (down -from 30 percent in
1979), 25 percent o-f Thailand's (up -from 2-3 percent in
1979), and 212 percent ot Singapore's GDP (ud -from 187
percent in 1979).CWorld Bank, 1983:156-1573 As Lawrence
Krause points out in his discussion o-f this topic, in the
case o-f Singapore "...exports can have greater value than
the total GDP i-f the import content of experts is very
large. " r Krause, 1982:223
The degree o-f success and extensive involvement o-f ASEAN
members in international trade is re-flected in the high
growth rates o-f trade shown in Table IV—VI.
TABLE IV-VI
INTERNATIONAL TRADE INDICES OF ASEAN COUNTRIES
Merchandise Average Annual
Trade (millions Growth Rate Terms o-f
o-f U.S.-S) (X) Trade
Exports Imports Exports Imports (1975=100)
Country 1981 1981 60-70 70-81 60-70 70-81 1978 1981
Thailand 6,913 10,014 5.2 11.8 11.4 4.9 37 62
Malaysia 12,884 13,132 5.8 6.3 2.3 7.1 109 101
Singapore 20,967 27,608 4.2 12.0 5.9 9.9 102
Indonesia 22,259 13,271 3.4 6.5 2.0 li.9 95 154
Philippines 5,722 7.946 2.2 7.7 7.2 2.6 98 68
Note: Brunei is not included here for lack of data.
SOURCE: The world Bank, World Development Report 1983.
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Manufactured oraducts constitute approximate! y 60
percent o+ ASEAN 's imports. Singapore retains the
dominant share of ASEAN 's manufactured goods exports market,
while Thailand and the Philippines are attempting to develop
their capacities in this regard. Fuels constitute a
significant share of imports for all of ASEAN, while
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore export large Quantities
of petroleum products. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore
are all net importers of food, while Thailand is one of the
largest net exporters of grains in the world. CKrause,
19S2:23D ASEAN 's total exports in 1982 amounted to over
$65 billion of which $12 billion was to the United States.
Imports totalled $73 billion, of which $10 billion came from
the U.S. CU.S. Dent, of State, 1983:13
The major trading partners of ASEAN, in order of trading
importance, are Japan, the United States, the European
Common Market members, and Saudi Arabi a. [ibid. 1
1 . Foreign Aid and Investment .
As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, a
substantial part of Indochina's economy is dependent on
foreign aid. Vietnam leads the community as usual having
received uncounted billions in aid over the last 30 years.
The total figure of foreign aid today is unknown, but some
observers estimate that this aid could account for as much
as a quarter of Hanoi 's present budget.
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Vietnam's aid comes -from western as well as
communist sources. 0-f the more significant Belgium.
Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden all
provide varying levels o-f aid and economic assistance.
Swede*n in particular has provided a significant level of aid
to the Vietnamese including outright grants, money to build
industrial projects, and assistance in building and running
twG hospitals.
C
lndochina Chronology . (April-June) 1983:53
Sweden reportedly grants some $100 million per year to
Vietnam, which has been ongoing since 1976.CSmith,
1983:12133 Swedish aid reported by Hanoi in 1983 totalled
-£30 mi 1 1 ion. C Indochina Chronology
,
(January-March) 1983:14-
153 Hanoi also reported a total of $200 million in aid
from France in 1933. Cibid. 3 Other western nations that
contribute lesser levels of aid or have investments in
Vietnamese activities include Great Britain and West
Germany.
C
FEER Yearbook 1983 :2763 Vietnam has also received
some aid from India, and has recently signed a agreement
with Delhi calling for an exchange of about $10 million in
bilateral trade.
C
Indochina Chronology , ( Januarv-March
)
1983:43
Additional aid from the West comes to Vietnam in the
form of humanitarian assistance from international
agencies. One such source, the United Nations Development
Program, has provided at least £113 million for agricultural
projects. CSmith, 1933:12123 Hanoi has reported that aid
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from international agencies totalled $625 million between
1975 and 1973.
L
Indochina Chronology , (January-March)
1983: 15:
Aid to Vietnam -from communist countries up to 1975
has been estimated at over $4,500 million. 0+ this. China
had supplied at least $1,800 million. [Smith, 1983:12133
Soviet aid from 1976 to 1980 amounted to $1.45
bi 1 1 ion. CQuinn-Judge, (May) 1933: SOD Hanoi has reported
aid -from socialist tates during 1982-33 amounted to $1,058
billion. Participants included the Soviet Union ($492
million), East Germany ($172 million), Hungary ($158
million), Czechoslovakia ($131 million), Bulgaria ($103
million), Rumania ($30 million), and Poland ($10
mi 1 1 i on ) .
C
Indochina Chronol ogy , (January-March) 1983:14-153
Much o-f this assistance comes in the -form o-f grants, and
"soft" loans. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has
indicated that socialist loans to Vietnam &rB given with low
interest rates (usually no more than 2 percent) and long
term pay back arrangements. In -fact, Moscow has cancelled
Hanoi 's debts on at least two occasions in the past. CQuinn-
Judge, May 1984:311
Laos has experienced dramatic shi-fts o-f sources c-f
-foreign aid since the communist dominance o-f Indochina.
Prior to 1975, the United States was the most important
source o-f aid -far Laos. 8v 1976, aid -from the U.S. had
13

stopped and aid from communist countries became paramount.
Be-fore 1973, significant -foreign aid came -from China, North
Korea, the Soviet Union, and various other Soviet bloc
members. Following the Kampuchean invasion and the China-
Vietnam border war in 1979, Chinese and North Korean aid to
the tune o-f $8 billion was suspended. Lacs has since had
to rely on Soviet, East European, and Vietnamese generosity,
with some outside assistance -from international donors such
as Sweden. CBurley, 1983:7093 Sweden recently granted Laos






Laos has also received aid on occasion -from the Netherlands,
Australia, and Japan (Tokyo granted $3 million in
19S3) . [ibid. 1 Estimates o-f current 'levels o-f aid run as
high as $100 million per year. This amounted to almost SO
percent o-f Laos' revenue in 1982. CThayer , (January) 1983:533
t
Aid to Kampuchea basically follows the same paths as
that of its two larger cousins. However, in Kampuchea's
case, most non-communist aid is directed towards relief of
the annual food and subsistance crisis. Relief aid in 1982
was estimated at *7,S00 mi 1 1 i on. CLei f er , 1983:6253
Soviet aid to Kampuchea since 1979 has been
estimated at $329 million in grants, and $150 million in low
interest loans.
[




Aid to the ASEAN countries has come from a
variety o-f regional and international sources. Regional
sources include national institutions such as the Inter-
Governmental Group o-f Indonesia (IGGI), and The Malaysian
Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) . Additionally,
help has been obtained from the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) , other major international bodies such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank.
Generally good fiscal responsibility has also
encouraged major nations like the United States to assist
ASEAN when requested. U.S. economic aid to ASEAN since 1979
has amounted to $19 million most of which has been allocated
to development programs in agriculture, energy, and
health. CU.S. Dept. of State. 1983:33
Foreign investment in ASEAN in 1979 was estimated to
be around $5 million. Direct investment accounted for one
third of this amount, official sources for another third,
and a final third came from portfolio and short-term
capital. Total direct foreign investment in ASEAN by 1979
was valued at a^/sr $16 billion. The largest percentage of
this capital went to Indonesia's petroleum industry (nearly
50 percent)
, with the remainder sol it between Singapore (25




2. Interactive Regional Trade
Trade between ASEAN and Indochina has been a touchy
subject since the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.
Politically motivated sanctions were levied against Hanoi,
and their vassals in Vientiane and Phnom Penh, by popular
concensus o-f the United Nations. This drive was led
vociferously by ASEAN and the United States. Subsequently,
economic contacts between ASEAN and Indochina seemed to
evaporate. In fact, rather than disappearing, economic
transactions simply went underground.
The case of Laotian-Thai trade relations is
particularly interesting in light of Thailand's position on
sanctions against Indochina. Not onlv has Thailand
sponsored much of ASEAN 's hard-line policy against Vietnam,
but they have also banned all transit of "strategic goods"
to Indochina through Thai territorv. Nevertheless, Thailand
continues to officially import electricitv (nearly -£21
million in 1982), and up to $2 million in other goods
such as timber, tin, and coffee. Unoffical imports of
timber, coffee, and opium which ^re smuggled into Thailand
add to Bangkok's cof f ers. CSricharatchanya, 1933:843
Thailand also does official business with Vietnam.
Imports of Vietnamese goods into Thailand were as high as
$850,000 in 1932 and close to * 146, 000 in 1983. Thai
exports to Vietnam totalled £245,000 in 1982, and $867,000
in 1933. As with Laos, this mav onlv be a fraction of the
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trade that is smuggled across Kampuchea between Bangkok and
Ho Chi Minh City- CMcBeth, (April) 1984:571!
Singapore is another of the staunchly ant i -Vietnam
members of ASEAN whose trade statistics with Indochina belie
their political convictions. Singapore's official eiioorts
to Vietnam in 1983 totalled more than $41 million, while
imports were valued at more than $29 million.
Unofficial trade may account for considerably more money
than has been reported. Vietnam's exports have mostly
consisted of rubber, tea. coffee, spices, and farm products.
Singapore has supplied petroleum products, chemicals,
textiles, fabrics and wheat to Vietnam. CKul karni . 1984:553
Malaysia and Indonesia Are also involved in various
deals with Indochina. Indonesia is presently involved in
exporting £1.7 million worth of textiles to Vietnam per
year, and may be expanding this volume.
C
Indochin a
Chronology , (January-March) 1983:33 Indonesia is also
reportedly involved in a large coking-coal contract with
Hanoi. CRees. 1984:563 Malaysia sold more than $374,000
worth of rubber processing equipment to Vietnam in 1983.
Malaysia 1 so exports goods valued at more than $40,000
annually to Vi etnam. Cibid. 1
D. SUMMARY,
The two major factions of Southeast Asia are as clearly
divided on economics as thev are in all of the other arenas
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of national and group interests. ASEAN prosper itv and
growth over the years o-f its ex i stance are sharp contrast to
Indochina's destitution, and this trend appears to be
continuing. Indochina's leaders, however, have displayed
their willingness to approach economic problems without the
hinderance o-f ideology, and to -find solutions in a pragmatic
fashion. ASEAN members have already taken advantage of this
condition and are conducting a fair level of trade with
Indochina, on this basis. It remains to be seen, however,
whether ASEAN will expand the ongoing trade and draw
Indochina further from the clutches of the socialist bloc.
In fact, this may be ASEAN ' s long-range intention, while
conducting regional business in their own low-keyed fashion.
Whatever the future of economic interaction, Indochina
clearly has a long way to go before it can conquer its
internal problems and participate in the greater world




V. PROBLEMS. OPTIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
CI earl v the pursuit o-f Deace and stability i n Southeast
Asia is beset by numberous problems in many areas.
Individual issues, however, such as that o-f the Kampuchean
question, are o-f ten over inflated manifestations of the
larger problem of regional power imbalances between two
differing poles. The key to regional stabilitv and peace
rests, therefore, in achieving and maintaining a balance
between the various aspects of power between these two
pol es.
Adding to the complexity of this task is the fact that
national assets in the region are often unevenly distributed
between ASEAN and Indochina throughout each of the
military, political, and economic arenas of interaction.
While this circumstance has both positive and negative
effects on the region. the negative value often outweighs
the advantages of the former. For example, on the positive
side, the disadvantages that ASEAN possesses in the
military arena tends to be offset by the strengths of its
superior economic and political arenas. This results in a
tenuous balance struck between the militarv and political
arenas. On the negative side, however, the weight of
Indochina's military power, combined with their unslacked
thirst for more political and economic clout. often
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jeopardizes the mi 1 i tary/pol i tical . bal ance, resulting in the
uncertain situation that characterizes the region today.
As historv has shown that no circumstance is static.
so too is change endemic to the present situation in
Southeast Asia. Time and change will act to either
exacerbate current -frictions and instabilities, or reduce
disagreements and strengthen the prospects -for peace. This
chapter summarizes the problems and options involved in
either eventual itv. and concludes with a -few words on the
likelihood o-f regional stabilitv through the rest of this
century.
A. PROBLEMS.
1 - Vietnam's Imperatives; Ideology and Security .
The most significant single problem facing
resolution of differences in Southeast Asia todav is that of
Vietnam's preoccupation with their leftist ideology.
Concerning peace and stability in the region, the Question
that thus presents itself is:
"...whether Vietnam can accept, in institutional
terms, the economic svstems (and societies) of the
region as they are now constituted or whether it is
in Vietnam's interest to push them to the
le-ft. "CPike, (November) 19S1:9D
Another aspect of this Question is whether Hanoi will
continue to allow the current erosion of its communist
orthodoxy to capitalist economic pragmatism. Perhaps a more
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accurate observation in this regard would be whether the
present Vietnamese leadership can long survive economic
pragmat i stTi, The evidence to date seems to indicate that
they can. CQuinn-Judge, (9 August) ; 14]
Along with the problems of political and economic
change, Vietnam must also contend with their growing
security imperatives. Historical precedence has shown
Hanoi that Vietnamese security is irreversibly tied to its
immediate Indochinese neighbors. Accordingly. the current
Vietnamese military control of Laos and Kampuchea is seen bv
Hanoi as being irreversible. Thus while ASEAN re-fuses to
recognize this tact, Vietnam's position in Indochina will
continue to be a major obstacle to real peace between them.
Not surprisingly, Vietnamese ideological and
security imperatives have o-f ten represented -formidable
obstacles to resolution o-f regional differences in the past.
No doubt thev will continue to do so in the future.
However, under conditions of mutual respect and
understanding for national positions, such obstacles could
be worked around and solutions to problems Arrived at. In
this regard ASEAN must find the maturity and self-confidence
to overcome their current fears and antipathies, recognize
Vietnam's imperatives and lead the way towards
normal i zati on.
14'

2. ASEAN's Concerns: Internal Divisions .
Among ASEAN ' 5 primary concerns, internal political
-fragmentation is probably only second in importance, to the
actual loss o-f one of its members to a non—capital i st
government. ASEAN correctly recognizes that their unified
strength is also potentially their weakest point. This
potential weakness has been sorelv tested bv Vietnam sines
ASEAN was initially founded. As succinctly stated bv
Leszek Buszvnski , the problem is that the:
"ASEAN countries differ as to the intensity of the
pressure that should be applied to Vietnam, the
extent to which Vietnam actually represents a threat
to the region and the advisability of protracted
reliance upon great-oower support to induce a change
in Vietnamese pol icy. " CBusznyski , (January) 1984:303
Along the lines of these considerations, ASEAN is
generally divided into two factions. Thailand and
Singapore are considered to be the strongest exponents of a
hard line towards Vietnam. Thailand because of its
position as ASEAN ' s front line state opposite Vietnam, and
Singapore because of Hanoi's close ties with the Soviet
Union, and the potential this has to disrupt the sea trade
lanes vital to Singapore's existence. Malaysia and
Indonesia represent the other ASEAN faction, prefering a
less hostile and more conciliatcrv attitude towards a
Vietnam that is geographically far away and presents little
threat to these nations. Malaysia and Indonesia also
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consider Vietnam to be considerab-1-v less of a threat than
that traditionally posed bv China. In some respects
Vietnam is regarded bv these two states as a necessary
buffer between themselves and what they perci eve to be
Beijing's designs on Southeast Asia. Due to phvsical
distance and a historical lack o-f common interests. the
Philippines normally takes a neutral stance on ASEAN 's
internal political decisions. supporting the dominant
-faction on specific issues.
Vietnam has -frequently used ASEAN 's division of
perceptions to its own advantage. Hanoi has made a point
o-f playing on Malaysian and Indonesian sensitivities toward
China, especially in regard to Thailand's increased ties
with Beijing. The success of this tactic was illustrated
most strongly in 19S0 when the Prime Ministers of Malaysia
and Indonesia, without consultation with the other ASEAN
members, bilaterally proposed the "Kuantan Principle."
This was suggested as an alternative to the accented ASEAN
position on Kampuchea. The "Kuantan Principle" called for:
"...a Vietnam free of Soviet influence but
independent of China. ,. concessions on Kampuchea
including acceptance of a Heng Samrin—dominated
government if it were "broader-based," termination
o-f ASEAN support of the Khmer Rouge government of
Democratic Kampuchea. and a position calling for





While bath governments eventually banked off o-f their stance
on Kuantan, the damage was done tDwarda tarnishing the
image of ASEAN unity, Vietnam has tried ever since to
expoit this chink in ASEAN's armor. Nevertheless, despite
periodic disagreements over the vears, ASEAN remains unified
and politically strong.
3. External Factors .
Regional problems and their resolutions ^rs heavilv
influenced by the "Great Powers". Local alignments with
external governments -frequently inflame regional problems
and hinder solutions for protracted periods of time. For
example. China's support of the exiled Khmer Rouge, and
their previous assistance to the North Vietnamese has lent
vears of miserv to the region. Soviet support to Vietnam
is doing the same for Indochina todav. Certainly neither
Vietnam's econcmv nor its massive military might could long
be maintained without Soviet aid. but the long term negative
effects of Soviet involvement in Indochina will be felt for
years to come. The concern of all of Southeast Asia has
been summed up by Jusuf Wanandi when he wrote:
"it is not in the interest of anv country in the
Southeast Asia region to see a Vietnam pressured by
any great power... ail ASEAN countries share some
concern about Vietnam's overdependence on the Soviet
Union, .. "C Wanandi , 1984:351
In this same light, the United States has
contributed its share to problems of instability in

Southeast Asia. America's long military involvement, and
its hasty withdrawal from the continent in the 70s. both
served to disrupt regional balances. The United States has
also been responsible, both directlv and indirectly, for the
long—standing isolation of Vietnam in the community of
nations. It is arguable that Washington's refusal to
normalize relations with one of the most significant powers
in Southeast Asia borders en political irresponsibi 1 itv not
only to its own oeoDle, but also to the nations of the
region that have relied on American friendship and security
for these many years. Not withstanding the humilities
suffered at the hands of the Vietnamese at the conclusion of
American military involvement on the mainland in 1975.
Washington's actions have pushed the Hanoi leadership
further into the opportunistic arms of the Russians, when
other avenues could have been explored. Additional I v
,
Vietnam's isolation by the United States has exacerbated the
traditional tensions between Indochina and ASEAIM,
encouraging these differences while paying only lioservice
to assisting their resolution. Thus it must be recognized,
in Washington as well as in the capitals of the ASEAN
countries, that America owes more to the resolution of




American interests in the region, past, present, and
esoecial I v -future clearly demand a more -flexible approach to
U.S. policy in the area. It the United States wants to
maintain its in-fluence in Southeast Asia, it must be willing
to accept its responsibilities both as a superpower and as a
long standing -friend of the region with much of the same
maturity that is demanded o-f its ASEAN allies. In this
respect . the United States could show its leadership bv
taking the -first steps towards the real resolution of
Southeast Asia's difficulties by normalizing its relations
with "all" of the nations o-f the region. Following a more
than adequate period of self —abnegati on for its past
difficulties in the region, the United States should not
hesitate to recover the momentum that it has lost to the
Soviets. and to involve itself more positively in
influencing policy decisions in this most crucial part of
the world.
Apart from the results of direct influence bv
external powers on the region, "great power" interaction
outside of the area often has had significant impact. The
recent alignment of China with the United States, and
China's hostility towards the Soviet Union have both been
felt in Southeast Asian politics. While ASEAN has
benefited from the U.S. -Chinese friendship, Vietnam has
likewise reaped rewards from the Soviet-Chinese sol it. In
this same reaard. one of the most disauietinq scenarios that
150

Hanoi could contemplate today would be one in which China
and the Soviet Union would reach some measure of detente.
While this situation could spell trouble -for the rest o-f
Southeast Asia as well, Vietnam stands to loose much in
terms o-f its current military predominance.
Though the potential -for this happening is currently
remote, the possibility holds much in the wav of opportunity
-for ASEAN-Indochinese rapprochement. Vietnam mav be well
advised to make their peace with ASEAN now, establishing
lines o-f support and security with its less aggressive
neighbors, be-fore it -finds itsel-f cast cut sometime in the
-future, bv one or more o-f its distant communist bene-f actors.





. Continued Isolation .
As intimated in the previous paragraphs, of the manv
options available for the future of Southeast Asia that of
the continued isolation of Indochina is orobablv the least
sensible. To date, this tactic used as a weapon has
vi elded only marginal benefits for ASEAN and has not served
U.S. interests at alL It has done little more than
increase mutual hostilities while acting in most cases to
reduce regional development. On the other hand. it has
increased the Soviet Union's influence in the reaion and

expanded their global position handsomely. ASEAN ' s and the
United State's economic embargoes, political isolation, and
thinly veiled threats o-f military alignment have simply not
been successful in solving Southeast Asia's problems.
Though possibly acting as a partial deterrent against
Vietnam in the early days of its institution, isolation is
clearly a thing of the past, and should be abandoned at the
earliest possible moment.
2. Escalation and Conflict .
Though onlv marginally a more likely option,
escalation of the current level of conflict between ASEAN
and ndochina into an open war is a possibility that must be
addressed. Failing some more eauitable arrangement, it is
always possible that some incident (such as those that occur
regularly along the Thai Kampuchean border) could cause a
rapid and unplanned for escalation into open warfare. The
fact that such an escalation could be planned as well, is
also a consideration that should be weighed no matter how
remote such an act seems. In any event, should escalation
and war occur, it is uncertain which side would loose the
most. Certainlv Thailand, being the "front line" state,
could not long withstand a full scale military exchange with
Vietnam. On the other hand, Vietnam stands to loose much
more in the way of economic and political sustenance from
the rest of ASEAN and the world, as a result of fiahtina

Thailand. Obviouslv neither ASEAN nr Indochina can be much
enamored of a war—fighting scenario. Though conditions can
change over time, it seems evident that at this point
escalation and increased conflict can not seriously be
considered to be a realistic solution to problems in the
region -for either side.
3. Compromise and Accommodation .
This scenario is probably the one most -favored in
Hanoi circles. As with all communist leaderships.
Vietnam's rulers would most like to be able to win constant
comoromise and easv accomodation -from the ASEAN governments.
Vietnam's record o-f diplomacy illustrates this desire. as
well as their typically communist methodology of attainment.
Hanoi has often used military force, "probing with the
bavonet" to achieve political compromise. retreating when
meeting opposition. and advancing when accomodation was
achieved. The problem facing the ASEAN countries todav is
determining the length to which they can afford to
comoromise and accomodate Vietnam.
Though no one tactic can be sufficient to cover all
circumstances. ASEAN must exercise extreme caution and
carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each
situation when dealing with Vietnam. To be successful in
this arena. ASEAN must be ever vigilant to its own long and
short—range security needs and be constantly aware of
Vietnam's foremost interests in itself. ASEAN must be

prepared to "probe" with the political "bavonet" and must
have the determination and courage to exploit their
opportunities when they present themselves. Only in this
light. can Hanoi 's game of compromise and accomodation be
attempted with some hope o-f success -for ASEAN.
4. Cautious Rapprochement .
Building on the precepts o-f the foregoing scenario,
the last but most likely option for the region is that of
eventual rapprochement , and the lessening of factional
disputes. This option is not only the most logical
scenario, but also the one solution that has the greatest
potential for long term peace. Rapprochement between ASEAN
and Indochina could be based on the successful resolution of
one particular problem. such as Kampuchea, or on a variety
of other smaller problems. Rapprochement will probably be
a long term process. as opposed to a sudden major
breakthrough on a large issue. The key is to establish an
opening on an issue and continue to expand good relations as
solutions to individual aspects of the issue present
themselves. A perfect example of this type of process is
that of the low keyed trade effort that is even now ongoing
between ASEAN and Indochina.
Economic ties between ASEAN and Indochina are
capitalistic by nature, and serve not onlv to promote the
immediate welfare of the trading partners, but also act to
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ameliorate the differences between their political systems.
Should ASEAN, (or the United States) wish, this type of
"capitalist" operation could be gradually expanded over a
period of time so that it affects not only Vietnam's
economic arena but her political and military s.rsna.'B as
well. While it is too early to tell, this relationship has
the greatest potential of resulting in eventual
normalization and the insurance of long—term stability,
Though some observers of Vietnam have voiced the opinion
that Hanoi can not be swayed by economic ties, this has yet
to be Droved. Conversely, there have been consistent
indicators from Hanoi reflecting the fact that economics
have indeed had great impact on Vietnam's direction in
recent years. If this be true, it may well be that it is
within ASEAN 's power today to determine whether economic
considerations are, or will be, one of Vietnam's "imperative
determinants. "CPike, (November) 1931:103 In this regard,
onlv time can reveal the truth of the matter. However,
ASEAN certainly can not afford to pass up the potential
opportunity that an economic path to rapprochement
represents to the prospects for future peace and stability.
C. CONCLUSIONS.
1 . Prospects for Peace and Stability Through the 1980s .
As shown in the previous discussion, the prospects
for peace in Southeast Asia hinqe on manv factors. both

external as well as internal.— Additionally* these
prospects grow in direct relation to the degree in which
many of these factors can be manipulated. neutralized or
eliminated. Along these lines, the local governments have
learned by experience that if the "great powers" can be
mollified, neutralized, or kept cut of direct involvement in
the region, the prospects for regional peace come closer to
realization, This perception has been espoused most
eloquently on more than one occasion by both ASEAN and
Indochina.
On the other hand, peace in small regions can often
be positively influenced by larger external powers. This
can occur when this influence is careful lv apportioned, to
prevent the rapid imbalances of power that can lead to war.
Thus, good judgement and political maturity on the part of
"great powers" can be a valuable asset to the pursuit of
peace when proper lv applied. This should be the goal of
all of the external powers when dealing with Southeast Asia.
The prospects of peace for the 80s is greater now
than at any other time in the history of the area. For the
first time in more than a thousand years, local indigenous
governments ^r<a in control of all of the major countries of
the Southeast Asian region. For a time at least. no
external power precludes the potential for agreement among
sovereign neighbors, to achieve a greater alignment than has
ever been seen in this part of the world. In this reaard , a
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sat i s-f actory and lasting peace can be achieved in war tarn
Southeast Asia today. Traditional animosities and problems
can be resolved by regional players. through regional
mechanisms such as economic interaction. External
involvement should be limited to low—keyed encouragement of
regional players, and positive reinforcement of peaceful
actions. While both regional factions have the need and
ability to achieve the goals of peace and stability at this
time, they are lacking the will to implement them. It is
postulated bv this thesis, however. that most of the
prerequi si t i es for these goals are alreadv in olace. and
that it is only a matter of time before manifestations of a
lasting peace, (such as normalisation), are forthcoming.
Though this desirable circumstance mav not become an
immediate achievement. (baring world war) . all indications




EXTRACTS FROM THE BANGKOK DECLARATION OF 1967
The essence at the objectives of ASEAN are as follows:
To accelerate economic growth, social progress and
cultural development in the region through joint endeavors
in the spirit o-f equality and partnership in order to
strengthen the -foundation -For a prosperous and peaceful
community o-f South East Asian nations.
To promote regional peace and stability through
abiding respect -for justice and the rule o-f law in the
relationship among countries c-f the region and adherence to
the principles o-f the United Nations Charter.
To promote active collaboration and mutual
assistance on matters o-f common interest in the economic,
social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative
fields.
To Drovide assistance to each other in the form of
training and research facilities in the educational,
professional, technical and administrative spheres.
To collaborate more effectively for the greater
utilization of their agriculture and industries, the
expansion of their trade, including the study o-f the
problems of international commodity trade, the improvement
of their transportation and communication facilities and the
raising of the living standards of their people.
To promote South East Asian studies.
To maintain close and beneficial co-operation with
existing international and regional organizations with
similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even
closer co-operation among themselves.
SOURCE: The Far East and Australasia. 1992-1933 (London:





i967 ASEAN formed at Bangkok. Bangkok Declaration.
1968 1st annual meeting ot ASEAN in Jakarta.
Indefinite cooling off period agreed to bv Malaysia
and the Philippines concerning dispute over
Sabah.
1969 No significant actions taken.
1970 Cambodian situation discussed at regional
conference. Withdrawal of all foreign troops
from Cambodia called for.
Sihanouk ousted in coup led bv Lon Noi
.
1971 "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" declared in
Kuala Lumour Declaration.
1972 ASPAC meeting urged co-operation with ASEAN and
accomodation with China.
1973 Australia ?< New Zealand endorsed "Zone of Feats"
declaration.
Philippines raised issue of foreign involvement in
Mindanao insurgency in ASEAN forum.
Rehabilitation assistance for Indochina urged.
Cease fire in Indochina signed by U.S. & Vietnam
U.S. POWs released from North Vietnam.
1974 Australia called for closer economic ties with
ASEAN in the fields of science, technology,
and trade.
China & Malaysia established closer ties.
China praised ASEAN ' s "Zone of Peace."
U.S. aid to Cambodia ended.
Coalition government established in Laos.
China siezed Paracel Islands.
1975 Instability o-f Vietnam and exodus of refugees on
ASEAN 's agenda.
China ?< the Philippines established diplomatic
rel ations.
Proposed Treaty of Friendship failed to gain
consensus amona ASEAN membership.
1C9

EEC in meeting with ASEAN vowed to continue
efforts to promote economic collaboration
and trade.
Lon Nol government tell to the Khmer Rouge,
ASEAN recognised Khmer Rouge (Sihanouk) regime in
Cambodi a.
Laotian coalition government fell—Fathet Lao
communists took over.
North Vietnam invaded and conquered the South.
Saigon tell 30 Apr.
1976 Treaty o-f Amity and Co-operation Sc Declaration o-f
Concord signed by ASEAN.
Socialist Republic o-f Vietnam established.
Spratlv Islands becoming controversial.
Australia attempted to improve relations with
ASEAN; signed economic Pact with ASEAN.
1977 Australia established review panel on ASEAN
affairs, proposed wider trade ties.
ASEAN Mutual Trade Agreement signed in Manila.
Soviets charged "imperialistic powers" increasing
attempts to trans-Form ASEAN into a military
bloc.
Laos signed Treatv o-f Friendship and Co-operation
with Vietnam, "Special Relationship" ?-: 30.000
Vietnamese troops established in Laos.
ASEAN backed promotion o-f peaceful relations with
Indochina. Assails internal communist rebels
as threats to Asian security. Western economic
ties urged.
S.R.V. became -full member of the United Nations.
Thai -Cambodi an border clashes noted.
Philipoines announced intention to drop claims to
Sab ah
.
Japan, New Zealand and Australian heads ot state
met with ASEAN counterparts. Pledged greater
economic co-operation.
Joint Thai -Mai aysi an -force battled rebels in
southern Thailand.
Thai—Vietnamese clashes noted over -fishing
tresoass.
1973 Secretarv-General o-f ASEAN, Indonesian General
Hartono Dharsono, ousted by Jakarta.
U.S. ?•< ASEAN held talks and agreed to "integrated
program -for commodities."
U.S. ?< ASEAN talks held on refugee problems and
neutrality towards communist states.
Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping toured Thailand.
Malaysia, Sinaapore and Burma.
160

Vietnam invaded Kampuchea " CCambodi a) . 25 Dec.
Vietnam signed Treaty o-f Friendship 2< Co-operation
with the Soviet Union, Joined COMECON.
197? ASEAN statement "strongly deplored the armed
intervention..." of Vietnam against Cambodia.
Called for the "immediate & total withdrawal o-f
the -foreign -farces..." -from Cambodia.
China invaded Vietnam, Feb-Apr.
ASEAN called -for a halt to hostilities between
China and Vietnam.
ASEAN members submitted U.N. resolution calling
-for an end to the Vietnamese invasion o-f
Cambodia and China's military action in
Vietnam. Soviets vetoed it.
Re-fugee meeting sponsored by ASEAN.
ASEAN countries announced their refusal to accent
any more refugees and reserved the right to
expel 1 those already in their countries. Calls
made to Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia.
Indochinese states unify on foreign affairs issues,
1980 Growing importance of ASEAN discussed in Chinese-
Japanese talks.
Maior cross-border skirmish conducted by Vietnam
near Aranvaorathet Thailand.
ASEAN communique issued condeming Vietnam for an
attack on Thailand. Indicates such action
"constitutes a grave and direct threat to the
securitv of Thailand and the 5E Asian region."
U.S. weapons airlifted to Thailand in response to
Vietnamese incursion, bv request of Thailand.
ASEAN rejects Vietnamese plan for Demilitarized
Zone along Thai —Cambodi an border; suggested
instead a U.N. supervised zone inside Cambodia.
Heng Samrin visited Moscow-Soviet aid increased to
Kampuchea.
19S1 China announced end of aid to insurgent movements
in SE Asia.
ASEAN reiterated support for 1980 U.N. Resolution
calling for an international peace conference
on Cambodia.
U.S. joins ASEAN in unified resistance against
Vietnamese supported government in Cambodia.
U.S. Secretary of State, Haig attended ASEAN
Summit Meeting.
ASEAN offers plan to send U.N. peacekeeping force
to Cambodia.




U.N. conference on Cambodia—convened due to ASEAN
pressure.
ASEAN, led bv Singapore, backs Cambodian exile
coal i ti on.
Pen Sovan replaced by Heng Samrin in PRPK congress.
1952 Malaysia wants ASEAN unity to break hold o-f oil
industry multinationals on regional energy
assets.
Cambodian exile unitv pressed bv ASEAN.
U.N. report predicted regional food shortages in
two ASEAN countries.
U.S. Vice President Bush toured Asia - included
stop at Singapore — praised Singapore's role
in ASEAN.
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach
visited ASEAN meeting; warned against ASEAN
support to Cambodian rebels.
Vo Nguyen Gi ap removed -from Vietnamese Politburo.
Vietnamese government reshuffled.
ASEAN mustered U.N. votes to maintain DK delegation
as legal representative o-f Kampuchea.
ASEAN martial s U.N. vote calling -for withdrawal o-f
Vietnam & sel-f—determination -for Kampuchea under
U.N. guarantee.
1953 Kamouchean exile government -formed under Sihanouk.
Vietnamese troop pull out announced-troops merely
rotated.
U.S. signed new base agreements with the
Phi 1 ippines.
ASEAN endorsed Thai proposal -for total withdrawal
of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.
Chinese-Vietnamese clashes reported on border.
Australian Foreign Minister visited Hanoi.
Japan threatened aid freeze to Vietnam until forces
are withrawn from Kampuchea.
1934 Brunei joined ASEAN as the sixth member. 7 Jan.
Independence of Brunei marked, 23 Feb.
Singapore implicated with China in supnlving arms
to Kamouchean exile groups.
Spring offensive launched by Vietnamese against
exile coalition camps along Thai—Kamouchean
border.
Thai Supreme Commander visited China's forward
positions along Vietnamese border. Thai-Chinese
military talks scheduled.




Hanoi announced another trooD withdrawal from
Kampuchea. Jul.
Hanoi noted seeking more militarv aid from Moscow
and communist allies. East Germany turned them
down.
Sporadic -fighting amongst Khmer Rouge and other
members of the Coalition observed.
ASEAN issued a strong condemnation of Vietnam's
presence in Kampuchea.
Vietnam's economic pragmatists won another round in
Hanoi's 6th Plenum.
Hanoi accused Thailand of complicity with China to
weaken Vietnam's security.
New influx of Laotian refugees in Thai 1 and
.
Hanoi indicates it is now willing to accept
international supervision and monitoring of a
Kampuchean settlement, after an agreement has
been reached.
Vietnam's Le Duan visited India in a gesture
suggesting Hanoi may be exploring new models of
development
.
SOURCE: Facts On File. World News Diaest With Index (Facts







The cat off date o+ the information in this equipment
inventory is June 1984. Figures reflect equipment
available. not necessarily operational. Operational status
of weapon systems is in some respects a transitory factor












(160) M-60A1 MET* (US)
400 M-4S PATTCN II* (US)





150 M-41 WALKER BULLDOG*
(US)
32 M-24 CHAFFEE* (US)
Armored Recon. Vehicles Armored Personnel Carriers
BRDM-2




S66 M-59 APC* (US)
1 , 780 M- 1 1 3A 1 * ( US
)
400 V-150 COMMANDO* (US)















M- 1944/55 100mm GUN
D-30 122mm GUN HOW
M-46 130mm GUN




M-102 105mm HOW* (US)
M-114 155mm HOW* (US)
M-109 155mm HOW* (US)
M-107 175mm SP HOW*
(US)








Tvoe 63/B-ll 107mm RCL
10 M-50 ONTOS SP
Anti ai rcra-ft
4,000 ZU-23-2 23mm AA GUN
M-53 30mm AA GUN
M-33/9 37mm AA GUN
40mm
S-60 57mm AA GUN
M-44 35mm AA GUN
M-49 100mm AA GUN
16-1

BM-14-16 140mm RL —
_..
KS-30 130mm AA GUN
M-37/41/42 S2mm MORTAR Tvoe 55 37mm AA GUN
107mm MORTAR 58 M-42 40mm DUSTER SP
M-38/43 120mm MORTAR AA GUN* (US)
M-43/53 160mm MORTAR 100 M-i 40mm L-60 Botors
AA GUN* (US)
ZSU-23-4 23mm SP GUN
ZSU-57-2 57mm SP GUN
Note: Weapons systems without numberical totals are
included in the total -figure for the system just preceding.
* Denotes U.S. eauipment obtained -from South Vietnam in
1975. Figures in parentheses ars totals -for eauioment






Frigates Fast Attack Craft
4 UK PETYA II Class S UR OSA-II Class PTG with
1 US BARNEGAT Class STYX SSM
1 US SAVAGE Class 3 UR SHERSHEN Class PTF
2 US ADMIRABLE Class
Patrol Boats Patrol Craft
4 UR S.0.-1 Class 2 UR P. 0.-2 Class
6 UR ZHUK Class 2 Bremse Class
8 CH SHANGHAI II Class 107 US SWIFT Class
17 US PGM Class
26 US CG POINT Class
Riverine War-fare Cra-ft Mine Warfare Ships
9 US CCB Class 1 YURKA Class
84 US ASPB Class 5 UR K-8 Class
42 US MONITOR MK-V Class " 8 US MSB-5 Class
22 US LCM (6) MONITOR Class 8 US MSM Class
100 US ATC Class
293 US PBR MK-II Class
Assault Ships i Miscellaneous Shins
3 UR POLOCNY B Class 1 UR KAMENKA Class
3 US LST 1/LST 542 Class 4 US 174 ft. Tanker
4 US LSM 1 Class 9 US YTL Type Tugs
14 US LCU 1466 Class
1 US LCU 501 Class





























20 FITTER C 9
-21 FISHBED F/PF/PFMA 11
-21 bis FISHBED N 7
-23 BN FLOGGER F 2
A FREEDOM FIGHTER* 50
) 41
B FREEDCM FIGHTER* (US) 32
SD TROJAN* (US) 11
E TIGER II* (US) 20
28 BEAGLE 24
7B DRAGONFLY* (US) 1
7B* (US) 4



























T-37C TWEETY BIRD* (US)
Mi seel I aneous
22 MI -6 HOOK
38 MI-8 HIP C
22 MI-24 HIND A
— MI-i4 HAZE
14 KA-25 HORMONE
245 UH-1B/H IROQUOIS* (US)
40 CH-34A SEA BAT* (US)
66 AH-1G COBRA* (US)
85 CH-47A/C CHINOOK* (US)
Air Defense
2 EC-47 E3M SKYTRAIN*
(US)
20 AC-47 DRAGON SHIP* (US)
— BE- 12 MAIL






* U.S. equipment captured from South Vietnam in 19/5





Army : 50 , 000 Personnel
Main Battle Tanks Light Tanks
— T-34/85 25 PT-76
— M-24 CHAFFEE* (US)
Armored Recon. Vehicles Armored Personnel Carriers
8 BTR-40 40 BTR-152
M-706* (US) M-113AI* (US)
Arti 1 lerv Antitank




155m HOW M-1939 37mm AA GUN










6 UR SHMEL Class
30 River Patrol Cra-ft
Miscellaneous Ura-Ft







42 UH-34 CHOCTAW (US)
10 MI-8 HIP C
2 MI -6 HOOK
6 ALOUETTE III (FR)









4 U-17A SKY WAGON (US)
1 DHC-2 BEAVER (US)
10 C-123 PROVIDER (US)
14 AU-24A STALLION (US)








170 M-43A5 PATTQN II
15 M-48A2 PATTCN II
470 M-47 PATTON I*
Armored Recon. Vehicles
150 SCORPION 90 (UK)
32 SHORLAND MK 3 (UK)
90 M-3A1 SCOUT*
30 M-l 6 HALF-TRACK*
16 M-8 GREYHOUND*
Artil lery
170 M-l 16 75mm pack HOW
371 M-101A1 105mm HOW
18 M-102 105mm HOW
62 M-114A1 155mm HOW
IS 155mm GUN/HOW (IS)
M-l 8 lmm MORTAR
170 M-29E1 31mm MORTAR
Light Tanks
20 M-24 CHAFFEE*












215 M-40A1 106mm RR
M-20A1 3.5" RL
inti aircraft
24 M-167A1 VULCAN SP AD GUN
FIM-43 REDEYE SAM
62 M-l 40mm L-60 Bo-fors AA GUN (SW/US)
IS M-42 40mm DUSTER SP AA GUN
Note; All of Thailand's Army equipment is o-f U.S. origin
except where otherwise indicated.


















2 MV 400TH Design
4 T-91 Class
10 US PGM 71 Class
4 US CG CAPE Class
7 US PC 461 Class
Mine War-fare Ships
12 New Construction
12 US SWIFT Class
37 US PBR MK-II Class
3 US RPC Class
Assault Shios
4 US BLUEBIRD Class
5 50 -ft. Motor Launches
2 US AGILE Class (Ocean!
2 BANGRACHAN Class
1 MCM Sudd ort Shio
Training Ships
1 UK ALGERINE Class





3 US CUTLASS Class
3 Seagoing Patrol Boats
4 US LST 542 Class
3 US LSM 1 Class
1 US LCI 351 Class
1 US LSSL i Class
4 New Construction
6 US LCU 501 Class
25 US LCM (6) Class
8 US LCVP Class










2 CHARN Class Tankers





Fiahter/Fi ohter Bombers Coun t er i nsur aen t Aircra-ft
24 F-5A FREEDOM FIGHTER
34 F-5E TIGER II
2 F-5B FREEDOM FIGHTER





14 AC-47D DRAGON SHIP
20 N-22B NOMAD
MIS3I0NMASTER (AS)
20 T-33A SHOOTING STAR
3 C-130H SPECTRE GUNSHIP
30 T-6G TEXAN
Reconnaissance Aircra-ft Transport Aircra-ft
4 RF-5A FREEDOM FIGHTER
6 RC-47 SKYTRAIN
4 RT-33 SHOOTING STAR
3 Arava IAI 201 ESM (IS)
5 Beech 65 QUEEN AIR/U-S
SEMINOLE
1 Cessna 310/U-3A
4 RT-33 SHOOTING STAR
20 C-47 SKYTRAIN




2 BAe HS-74S (UK)
1 BN-2 ISLANDER (UK)
Trainers Hel i cooters
24 CT-4 Airtrainer
10 CHIPMUNK
14 T-37C TWEETY BIRD
6 0-1A BIRD DOG
4 T-41D MESCALERO
12 SF.260 MT Trainer (IT)
40 CH-34A CHOCTAW
63 UH-1H IROQUOIS
2 Bell Model 214
3 HH-433 HUSK IE
13 CH-19E CHICKASAW
Mi seel 1 ansous Air Defense
5 U-10A SUPER COURIER
4 DHC-2 BEAVER (CA)
44 L-21A/ Piper L-1S
10 TURBO PORTER (SZ)





1 Beech KING AIR 100/U-21
UTE
13 U-17A SKY WAGON**
1 Beech B9?
23 T-41D MESCALERO**









Bel 1 Model 206
Bell Model 214B
Naval Aviation



















General Purpose Hel i cooters
3 SC-7 3M-200 SKYVAN (UK)
8 PC-6 (SZ)
2 DHC-2 BEAVER (CA)




3 DHC-4 CARIBOU (CA)
10 Bell Model 204B
11 Bell Model 205
2 Bell Model 205A




NOTE: All Thai aircra-ft ars of U.S. origin unless otherwise
indi cated.






Army: SO. 000 Personnel
Armored Recon, Vehicles Armored Personnel Carriers
60 FERRET MK4 (UK)
50 PANHARD AML 90 (FR)














M-56 105mm Dk HOW (IT)
M-101A1 105mm HOW (US)









PANHARD M3 APC (FR)
AT- 105 SAXON (UK)
M-2A 1 HALF-TRACK* ( US
)
SI NBAS AFV (BE)
M-20A1 3.5" RL (US)
M-2 S4mm RL (SW)
M-20 S9mm RL (YD)
120mm RKT (UK)
SS-11 ATSW (FR)
M-40A1 106mm RR (SP
M-80 38mm RL
Anti airora-f t
23 M-2 40mm L-70 Bo-fors AA GUN (US/SW)
12 M-l 40mm L-60 Bo-fors AA GUN (US/SW)
57mm GUN (SW)
IS SCORPION SP AA GUN (UK)





Friaates Fast Attack Cra-Ft







22 KRIS/KEDAH/SABAH CI as;
Assault Shios
5 US LCM (6) Class
9 US RCP Class
15 LCP Class







with 2-4 EXOCET SSM
COMBATTANTE II PERDANA





2 UK TON Class
Mi seel 1 aneous










Fighter /Fighter Bombers* Counter insurgent Aircraft
12 F-5E TIGER II (US) 16 Canadair CL-41G TEBUAN
2 F-5F TIGER II (US) 12 AerMacchi MB-339 (IT)
Reconnaissance Aircraft Transport Aircraft
3 PC-130H HERCULES (US) 6 C-130H HERCULES (US)
2 RF-5E TIGER II (US) 2 HS-125 (UK)
2 F-23 MK 1000 ( )
12 Cessna 402B/U-3B (US)
15 DHC-4A CARIBOU (CA)
2 DH DOVE (UK)
3 DH HERON (UK)
1 SUPER KING AIR 200
(US)
Trai ners Hel icopters
15 BAe BULLDOG 102 (UK) 40 S-61A SEA KING (US)
44 Pilatus PC-7 (SZ) 27 ALOUETTE III (FR)
3 UK SIOUX (UK) 20 3A-341K GAZELLE (FR)
7 Bell 47G SIOUX (US)
3 UH-1H IROQUOIS (US)
5 Bell Model 206B (US)
3 Bell Model AB-212 (US)
Para-Military Aviation
General Purpose
3 C-130H-MP HERCULES (US)
1 HS-125M (UK)
4 Cessna V206C STATIONAIR (US)





Main Battle Tanks Light Tanks
60 M60-A1 (US) 350 AMX-13 Model 51* (FR)
Armored Personnel Carriers Arti 1 lery
720 M-113A1 (US) 52 M-6S 155mm HGW (IS)
250 V- 150/200 COMMANDO** (US) IS M-114A1 155mm HOW (US)
30 V-100 COMMANDO (US) 60mm MORTAR (IS)
SI mm MORTAR (IS)
50 M-3S 120mm MORTAR (IS)
Ant i tank Anti aircraft
M-20 S9mm RL (YO) 20 L-70 40mm Botors A
A
M-2 84mm RL (Sw1 ) GUN (SW)
90 M-40A1 106mm RL (US)
* May De converting power packs to diesel.






Fast Attack Cratt Patrol Boats and Craft
6 TNC/FPB 45 Class 3 German FPB 57 Clas<
with 5 GABRIEL GSM 3 110 -Ft. Type A
3 110 -ft. Type B
1 UK FORD Class
1 NE 250 Ton Class
Mine War-fare Ships Assault Ships
2 US REDWING Class 6 US LST 542 Class
4 AVER CHAWAN Class
2 BRAN I Class
Marine Police Miscellaneous Ships
12 US SWIFT Class 19 New Construction
4 PX Class





Fianter /Fianter Bombers Counter insuraent Aircraft
40 A-4S/S1 SKYHAWK (US)
6 TA-4S SKYHAWK (US)
24 F-5E TIGER II (US)
3 F-5F TIGER II (US)
38 HUNTER MK 74/T.75 (UK)
6 JET PROVOST T, Si-
ll SF.260W WARRIOR (IT)
19 STRIKENASTER MK 82/31
Trainers Hel i copters
18 BAC-167 (UK)
— STRIKEMASTER MK 84
14 SF.260MS Trainer (IT)
20 T-33A SHOOT I NG STAR (US)
6 AIRTOURER
36 UH-1B/H IROQUOIS (US)
3 Bell Model AB-212 (US)
6 AS-350B ECUREUIL (PR)
7 ALOUETTE III (FR)
Transport Aircra-ft
6 SC-7 3M-200 SKYVAN SAR Type (UK)
4 0-1 30B HERCULES (US)
Air Defense







Li ant Tanks Armored Recon. Vehicles
350 AMX-13 90 <FR)
75 PT-76 <UR>
108 M-3A1 STUART* (US)
75 SALAD IN (UK)
60 FERRET (UK)
BRDM (UR)
AMX-10 PAC 90 (PR)
Armored Personnel Carriers Artillery
200 AMX-VCI <FR)
130 BTR-40/152 (UR)
112 M-2A1 HALF-TRACK* (US)
BTR-50 (UR)
60 V-150 COMMANDO (US)
60 SARACEN (UK)
Antitank
M-20A1 3.5" RL (US)
335 . M-40A1 106mm RL (US)
33mm RL (UR)
33mm AT RL (BE)
85mm RL (UR)
M-20 S9mm RL CYO)
M-51 130mm MRL (CZ)
RPU-14 140mm MRL (UR)
M-18A1 57mm R.R (US)
M-20 75mm RR (US)
B-10 S2mm RCL GUN (UR)
B-ll 107mm RCL GUN (UR)
M-67 90mm RR (US)
50 76mm Mt HOW (SW)
M-1998 B-l 76mm HOW
(YO)
88mm GUN/HOW (UK)
40 105mm GUN/HOW (YO)
— M-38 122mm HOW (UR)
15 M-101A1 105mm HOW (US)
80mm MORTAR (YO)
-
— M-l 81mm MORTAR (US)
M-37 82mm MORTAR (UR)









20 20mm AAA GUN (SW)
90 M-l 40mm L-60 Bo-f or s AA GUN (US/SW)
200 S-60 57mm AA GUN (UR)









4 EXOCET SSM, 1 with
1 WASP Helicopter
KAPftL LATIH Class with
4 EXOCET SSM
PATTIMURA Class
US CLAUD JONES Class
UR RIGA Class
PSK/PSMM Mk-5 Class
with 4 EXOCET SSM
Patrol Boats
CARPENTARIA Class




KAPAK Class (Sea Cornm)
KUJANG Class (Sea Cornm)
PAT-01 Class (Sea Cornm)
Assault ShiDS Miscellaneous Shies
23







1 UR DON Class Sub Tender
1 Command Ship
5 Utility Ships




Submar i nes Marine Police
2 Type 209 (GE)
1 UR WHISKEY Class
9 DKN 908 Class
12 DKN 504/901 Cla«
Marine Equipment Customs Service
30 PT-76 Light Tks 3 Lurssen PB 57 Design
12 VPX-10 PAC 90 AC 23 Lurssen FPB 23 Class





Air -force: 29,000 Personnel
Fighter/highter Bombers*
27 A-4E SKYHAWK (US)
4 TA-4H SKYHAWK (US)
11 F-5E TIGER II (US)
4 F-5F TIGER II (US)
16 CA-27 SABRE (AS)
2 B-26 INVADER (US)
Counter insurgent Aircra-ft
16 DV-10F BRONCO (US)
14 F-51D MUSTANG (US)
Reconnaissance Aircraft Transport Aircra-ft
1 C-130H-MP HERCULES (US)
1 Boeina 737-200 (US)
7 C-130H-30 HERCULES (US)
7 L- 100-30 HERCULES (US)
1 C-140 JET STAR (US)
12 C-47 SKY TRAIN (US)
3 SC-7 3M-200 SKYVAN (UK)
8 Fokker F-27 MK400M (NE)
25 Casa Aviocar C-212 (SP)
1 Boeing 707 (US)
d IM— ^-H-M !M'_'!"!f-!L.>
SEARCHMASTER L (AS)
Trainers Hel icooters
15 T-34C1 MENTOR (US) 5
8 T-53 HAWK ( ) 19
20 AS-202 BRAVO ( ) 16
2 T-6 TEXAN (US)
10 T-33A SHOOTING STAR (US) 12
Mi seel 1 aneous 6
7 DHC OTTER (CA) 4
S HU-163 ALBATROS 4
12 Cessna T207/401/402A 1











* Additional inventory includes 22 TU-16 BADGER; 10 IL-2S
BEAGLE; 4 MIG-15 FAGOT: 3 MIG-17 FRESCO; 15 MIG-21 FISHBED,







1 DHC BEAVER (CA)
1 Beech B99 (US)
«-J U-4B GRAND COMMANDER
(US)
2 C-47 SKVTRAIN (US)
6 Cessna 207 SKYWAGON
(US)








16 Bell Model 205 ;US:
Naval Aviation
Mar i t i me Ut i 1 i tv Hel icopters
12 N24A NOMAD
SEARCHMASTER B (AS)
1 C-130H-MP SAR (US)
6 C-47 SKYTRAINB (US)
5 HU-16B ALBATROSS (US)
3 ALOUETTE III (FR)
4 MBB BO- 105 (GE)
3 ALOUETTE II (FR)
4 Bell 47G/0H-13 SIOUX
(US)
7 S-58/H-34 CHOCTAW (US)
12 UH-34D SEA HORSE (US)
Para-Military Aviation




Armv : 70 , 000 Per sonnel
Light Tanks















78 M-lOiAl 105mm HOW
125 105mm HOW (SP)
12 105mm pk HOW (IT)




40 M-30 4.2" MORTAR
Note: All Philippine equipment is o-f U.S. origin except
where otherwise indicated.






4 US BARNEGAT/CASCO Class 2 US AUK Class
1 US SAVAGE Class 7 US PCE S27 Class
2 US CANNON Class 1 US ADMIRABLE Class
Fast Attack Cra-ft Patrol Boats
3 New Design with 2 KATAPANGAN Class
EXOCET SSM 5 US PGM-39/-71 Class
2 US PC-4&I Class
Patrol Cra-ft Mine Warfare Ships
SO Fiberglass Hulls 2 US MSC Type
6 Australian Attack Class
29 US SWIFT Class
o ABRA Class
Assault Shi os Mi seel 1 aneous Sh i- p_s
22 US LST 1/542 Class 1 Support Ship
4 US LSM 1 Class 1 US AM Type
54 US LCM (6/8) Class 1 Presidential Yacht
7 US LCVP TvDe S Transports ,
3 US LCU 1466 Class 3 US ACHEL0U5 Class
3 US LSSL i Class 10 Tankers
4 US LSIL Tvpe 6 Floating Dry Docks
3 US ARL Repair Ships 3 Survey Shins
Marine Equipment Coast Guar d
30 LVTP-5 2 BESSANG Pass Class
55 LVTP-7A1 APC 1 Search S< Rescue Boat
105 105mm HOW
4.2" 107mm MORTAR









F-SH CRUSADER (US) 16 SF.260WP WARRIOR (IT)
F-5A FREEDOM FIGHTER 24 T-28A TROJAN (US)
(US) 4 HU-16B ALBATRQS (US)
F-53 FREEDOM FIGHTER (US) 6 HU-16E AL3ATR0S (US)
F-5E TIGER II (US)
F-S6F SABRE (US)
11 AC-47 DRAGON SHIP (US)
36 T-36A (Fuji) MENTOR
Transport Aircraft Trai ners
6 C-130H HERCULES (US)
3 L- 100-20 HERCULES (US)
30 C-47 SKYTRAIN (US)
9 Fokker F-27 MK100 (NE)
12 N22B NOMAD
MISSIONMASTER (AS)
46 BN-2/2T ISLANDER (UK)
15 C-123B/K PROVIDER (US)
10 T-33A SHOOTING STAR
3 RT-33A SHOOTING STAR
12 T-41D MESCALERO (US)
32 SF.260MP Trainer (IT)
Hel i cooters Mi seel 1 aneous
50 UH-1H IROQUOIS (US) 1
38 MBB BO- 105 (GE) 1
2 UH-1N IROQUOIS (US) 4
1 SA-330L PUMA (FR)
12 UH-1D IROQUOIS (US) 1
3 FH-1100/0H-5 (US)
1 KH-4/0H-13 SIOUX (US) 8
12 Hughes 500M/0H-6 3
CAYUSE (US)





Boeing 707 VIP (US)
BAC-111 VIP (UK)
YS-11 VIP









Maritime Utility Hel icooters
10 MARITIME DEFENDER/
ISLANDER (UK)
3 F-27 FRIENDSHIP (US)












16 31 mm MORTAR
Armored Personnel Uarriers












3 BENDAHARA CI a*
Marine Pol i ce
2 LOADMASTER Class LCT




2 SF.260 Trainer (IT)
1 HS-74S VIP (UK)
Hel icQDters
3 Bell Model 206B (US)
3 Bell Model 205A (US)
11 Bell Model 212 (US)
1 HS-76 (US)
7 MBB BQ-105 (GE)
+ Both the Navv and the Air Force are Dart of the Army.
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